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Departures Under the Federal Sentencing

Guidelines: An Empirical and Jurisprudential
Analysis
Michael S. Gelacak, Ilene H. Nagel, and
Barry L. Johnson*

INTRODUCTION
A. THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT, THE SENTENCING
GUIDELINES, AND DEPARTURES

The result of nearly two decades of bipartisan efforts to reform federal criminal sentencing, the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 (SRA) and the United States Sentencing Guidelines
(Guidelines), represent the most extensive modification of federal sentencing practices in this century.' The sentencing reform movement was driven primarily by the widespread perception that courts give similarly situated offenders vastly
disparate sentences. 2 These sentencing disparities were based,
* The authors would like to thank Janeen M. Heaney, Attorney-Advisor
to Commissioner Michael S. Gelacak, for her assistance in preparing this Article. The authors further acknowledge the assistance of Heather R. Epstein,
Karen Kelly, Lori Fee, Rich McNeil, Gerry Kirk, and other Sentencing Commission staff for their work on this project.
Michael S. Gelacak is currently the Vice Chairman of the United States
Sentencing Commission. Ilene H. Nagel is the Associate Provost for Research
and Dean of the Graduate School for the University of Maryland at College
Park. Barry L. Johnson is an Assistant Professor of Law at the Oklahoma
City University School of Law.
1. See, e.g., ilene H. Nagel, StructuringSentencing Discretion: The New
FederalSentencingGuidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 883 (1990)
(characterizing the SRA as "the most broad reaching reform of federal sentencing in this century").
2. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 41-46 (1983), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3183, 3224-29 (describing the problem of unwarranted sentencing disparity
and concluding that such disparities are unfair to both offenders and the public).
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in part, on varied sentencing values and preconceptions among
individual district court judges, and on each judge's virtually
unlimited discretion to fashion sentences according to her own
sense of what constitutes just and effective sentencing.3 To address this problem, and related issues of discrimination and
lack of certainty, Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission (Commission),4 a permanent, seven-member
body comprised of judges and experts in the field of criminal
justice, aided by a professional research staff. Congress instructed the Commission to promulgate mandatory sentencing
guidelines, thereby limiting and structuring the discretion of
sentencing judges in order to reduce unwarranted sentencing
disparity.6
The SRA requires judges to impose sentences within
guideline ranges specified by the Commission. The relevant
characteristics of the offender and his or her offense provide
the bases for these ranges. Congress contemplated that the
Commission's Guidelines would be sufficiently broad and
flexible to provide just and effective individualized sentences in

3. See, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1, 4-9 (1972) (describing the enormous discretion that judges exercise in
sentencing and the resulting predominance of judges' personal beliefs in sentencing decision making). As Judge Frankel explained:
The factual basis for the worry [about sentencing disparity] is clear
and huge; nobody doubts that essentially similar people in large
numbers receive widely divergent sentences for essentially similar or
identical crimes. The causes of the problem are equally clear: judges
vary widely in their explicit views and "principles" affecting sentencing; they vary, too, in the accidents of birth and biography generating
the guilts, the fears, and the rages that affect almost all of us at
times and in ways we often cannot know.... It is disturbing enough
that a charged encounter like the sentencing proceeding, while it is
the gravest of legal matters, should turn so arbitrarily upon the
variegated passions and prejudices of individual judges.
Id. at 7-8.
4. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 65 (arguing that the SRA is intended to
"make criminal sentencing fairer and more certain").
5. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 991(a), 995, 996 (1984) (establishing the seven-member
Commission); S. REP. No. 98-225, at 63-65 (outlining the Commission's composition and authority); Nagel, supra note 1, at 883-84 (describing the Commission's purpose, authority, and composition).
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1984) (requiring the Commission to promulgate
detailed sentencing guidelines and specifying criteria to which the guidelines
should conform); S. REP. No. 98-225, at 51 (explaining that "It]he purpose of
the sentencing guidelines is to provide a structure for evaluating the fairness
and appropriateness of the sentence for an individual offender").
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most cases.7 Congress also recognized, however, that because
the range of criminal conduct is vast, individualized sentencing
would sometimes require consideration of facts and circumstances that the Commission did not adequately address in the
overall Guidelines scheme.' Thus, the SRA provides sentencing judges with discretion to depart from the applicable Guidelines range if aggravating or mitigating circumstances exist
which the Commission did not adequately consider, warranting
imposition of a sentence outside the Guidelines range.' The
SRA further requires that judges state on the record the reasons for departure ° and that the appellate court review the departure sentence for reasonableness. 1
Congress's decision to remove a significant portion of
judges' sentencing discretion and to place much of that discretion in the Commission was, and remains, highly controversial. 2 Moreover, because the ability to depart from the Guidelines is a major source of the judicial discretion that remains
under the Guidelines system, 3 the departure provisions have

7. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 52-53 (explaining that while the SRA is intended to reduce unwarranted sentencing disparities, the Guidelines should
also "enhance the individualization of sentences by imposing on judges a
structure for evaluating the fairness of particular sentences in light of individual case characteristics").
8. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 51-52 (explaining that under the Guidelines a judge "has an obligation to consider all the relevant factors in a case"
and may impose a sentence outside the Guidelines if she finds "an aggravating or mitigating circumstance present in this case that was not adequately
considered in the formulation of the guidelines").
9. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994) (allowing departures from guideline sentences as circumstances warrant, if those circumstances were not adequately
considered by the Commission in promulgating the Guidelines).
10. Id. § 3553(c)(2) (requiring a statement of specific reasons for any sentence imposed outside the Guidelines range).
11. Id. § 3742 (providing for appeal of sentences above or below the applicable Guidelines range by either the State or the defendant).
12. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Failureof Sentencing Guidelines:A
Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 918-29 (1991) (criticizing
the Guidelines for causing inequality and irrationality in sentencing); Gerald
W. Heaney, Revisiting Disparity: Debating Guidelines Sentencing, 29 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 771, 774 (1992) (arguing that the Guidelines shift discretion
from judges to prosecutors, who make their decisions "behind closed doors and
[are] subject neither to public scrutiny nor judicial review"); Jose Cabranes,
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Dismal Failure, Remarks at the University of Chicago Law School (Jan. 15, 1992).
13. See Edward R. Becker, Flexibilityand DiscretionAvailable to the Sentencing Judge Under the Guidelines Regime, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1991, at
10, 10 (noting that "[tlhe most widely recognized avenue of flexibility under
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been the subject of considerable debate. There is much disagreement among judges and commentators about how often
and under what circumstances judges should depart from the
Guidelines.14
Despite the acknowledged importance of departures in the
Guidelines scheme, there has been little empirical study of how
sentencing judges actually use the SRA's departure provisions
or of how departure practices affect the goals of sentencing reform.' 5 Consequently, much of the existing analysis of depar-6
ture issues is based on limited samplings of appellate caselaw.'
We believe that the policy debate surrounding departures could be
improved and better informed through a more comprehensive
analysis of departure practices. This belief prompted the research described in this Article.
B. THE PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE
The research upon which this Article is based 7 explores
how and when federal sentencing judges exercise their statutory authority to depart from the Guidelines. This departure
power has important implications for the implementation of
the guidelines is the sentencing judge's ability to depart from the prescribed
sentencing range").
14. See, e.g., Judy Clarke & Gerald McFadden, Departures from the
Guideline Range: Have We Missed the Boat, or Has the Ship Sunk?, 29 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 919, 921-31 (1992) (arguing that the SRA requires substantial
flexibility and discretion in sentencing); see also infra notes 82-126 and accompanying text (recounting competing views about the scope of the SRA's
departure provisions).
15. This is not to say that there have not been some excellent analyses of
departure issues. See, e.g., Bruce M. Selya and Matthew R. Kipp, An Examination of Emerging Departure Jurisprudence Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 18-49 (1991) (discussing early trends
and emerging issues in appellate departure caselaw). Possibly due to a lack of
available information about departure practices at the district court level,
however, commentators have tended to focus exclusively on appellate departure jurisprudence. Unfortunately, because most downward departures are
never appealed, analysis of appellate cases fails to tell the complete story. See
infra text accompanying notes 20-21 (discussing the limitations of research
based solely on appellate departure caselaw).
16. See, e.g., Kirk D. Houser, Downward Departures:The Lower Envelope
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 31 DUQ. L. REV. 361, 361 (1993) (describing appellate decisions dealing with downward departures as the
"principal focus" of an analysis of the lower limits of judicial discretion in sentencing).
17. This Article arises from a broader departures research project involving data from all 12 United States circuit courts of appeals. The Commission
is in the process of analyzing data from the remaining circuits not covered in
this Article and is in the process of compiling a report detailing its findings.
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the Guidelines system. If judges depart from the Guidelines
too frequently or for inappropriate reasons, they may defeat
the SRA's purpose of eliminating unwarranted sentencing disparity. Conversely, the failure to depart in appropriate cases
may result in excessive rigidity in sentencing. Thus, proper
use of the flexibility contained in the departure authority is
crucial to the effective functioning of the Guidelines and the
goals of uniformity, certainty, and reduction in sentencing disparity and discrimination. 8
Because of the important role departures play in the
overall Guidelines scheme, an understanding of departure
practices-the types of cases in which sentencing judges depart, the extent of departures, and the reasons for departures-is essential to an evaluation of Guidelines sentencing
and to efforts to improve the Guidelines. We designed our research to increase the understanding of the use of the Guidelines departure provisions. This Article analyzes, both qualitatively and quantitatively, the departure patterns of thirty
United States district courts, drawn from six circuits, in fiscal
years 1991 and 1992."9
Our focus on the departure behavior of district courts is
meant to respond to the inherent limitations on research based
solely on reviews of appellate caselaw. For several reasons,
analyses of appellate departure caselaw alone presents an incomplete and skewed picture of the exercise of judicial discretion through departure. First, United States attorneys' offices
do not appeal the vast majority of downward departures because of time and resource constraints.2" Because appellate
courts seldom review departure decisions, analyses of patterns
and trends in appellate caselaw alone would present a misleading account of actual departure activity. Second, review of departure practices at the district level permits assessment of the

18. See Nagel, supra note 1, at 938-39 (arguing that the SRA's departure
provisions represent a compromise between sentencing uniformity and flexibility, the success of which depends on how the provisions are exercised).
19. Comparable analyses for a sample of cases from the remaining federal
circuits with jurisdiction over criminal cases will be conducted and presented
in phase 1I of this two-part research program. Because we were interested in
intercircuit comparisons, and because such comparisons would be cumbersome for 12 circuits at once, we divided the research into two phases.
20. The time and resource constraint may be attributed to the requirement that the Department of Justice approve all government appeals of departure sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b) (1994) (requiring the Attorney
General or Solicitor General to approve the government's appeals).
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extent to which the district courts follow appellate caselaw.
Because many departures are not appealed, it is possible that
the district courts do not consistently follow appellate caselaw.
Merely assessing appellate jurisprudence to determine the
availability and use of certain kinds of departures may provide
a distorted account of the actual role of departures in Guidelines sentencing. This is not to argue that the appellate caselaw should be ignored; rather, it is to assert that adequate assessment of departure practices must include an examination
of district court departure decisions.
Through the intensive, qualitative analysis of district court
departure activity, we seek to understand the real activity underlying the aggregate statistical data on departures. This Article primarily seeks to evaluate whether the "lore" surrounding variations in different courts' approaches to departures is
true2 ' and whether there are any discernible patterns in the
characteristics of cases thought to warrant departure.
The empirical data summarized here were drawn from a
study of thirty districts. The results were analyzed in light of
the appellate departure jurisprudence of the six United States
circuit courts of appeals from which the thirty districts were
selected, as well as the SRA's language and legislative history
and the Guidelines' text.
Part I of this Article describes the background and legislative history of the departure provisions of the SRA and the
Guidelines. It also notes, in particular, the divergent views of
courts and commentators regarding the extent to which departures are an appropriate mechanism for individualizing sentencing, even when cases are not unusual or atypical. Part I
seeks to determine, to the extent possible, how congressional
proponents of the SRA viewed the role of departures in the
Guidelines scheme. Finally, Part I provides a glimpse of the
basic structure and application of the Guidelines and explains
how the Commission attempted to provide for an important,
yet limited, role for judicial departures.
Part II explains the study's methodology and research design. Part III presents a summary of the appellate departure
jurisprudence of six of the twelve United States courts of ap21. For example, it is commonly believed that courts in some circuits are
very open to downward departures but not to upward departures, while other
courts take the opposite view. See, e.g., infra Part III (summarizing the
study's findings regarding the six circuits' departure jurisprudence characteristics).
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peals. This part highlights the relevant similarities and differences in departure caselaw among these six circuits. This
serves not only to outline important jurisprudential issues, but
also to provide background for our subsequent exploration of
whether and how appellate decisions affect departure patterns
at the district court level.
Part IV presents an analysis of over 1,400 departure sentences. The thirty district courts, selected from the six United
States courts of appeals, imposed these sentences in fiscal
years 1991 and 1992. The Article draws its data from the
Commission's extensive case monitoring files. Based on detailed review of the Commission's files, we coded each for the
following characteristics: the stated reason for departure; the
extent of departure; the offense type; the race, gender, and socioeconomic status of the offender; and whether the conviction
resulted from a guilty plea. We also noted any comments made
by the sentencing judge that might tend to reveal the judge's
attitude toward departures, or toward the Guidelines in general. We then analyzed this data to determine if any discernible patterns emerged across districts or circuits, or if important
variations existed between districts or circuits. Finally, Part
IV analyzes the implications of our findings for the Guidelines'
effective functioning.
I.

THE ROLE OF DEPARTURES IN THE
GUIDELINES SCHEME

A. THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT
Prior to the SRA's enactment, broad discretion characterized modern federal sentencing. Judges were free to impose
any sentence below the statutory maximum applicable to the
offense of conviction.22 Judges based their sentencing decisions
on whatever information they deemed relevant.2 3 Their decisions reflected individual
notions of justice and views on the
24
purposes of sentencing.
22. See, e.g., Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958) (noting that
a sentence within statutory limits is generally not subject to review).
23. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 251 (1949) (holding that
the Constitution does not prohibit a sentencing judge from considering information inadmissible at trial).
24. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 41-46 (1983), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3183, 3224-39 (outlining disparities revealed by studies of various jurisdictions and concluding that these disparities could not be explained by differ-
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As early as 1933, studies of the exercise of judicial sentencing discretion began to reveal significant disparities in the
length and type of sentences imposed on similarly situated offenders.2" In the late 1960s and early 1970s, renewed interest
in criminology and prison reform spurred a number of empirical studies of sentencing practices which demonstrated widespread, unwarranted sentencing disparity.2 6 As Judge Marvin
Frankel, one of the key voices in urging sentencing reform,
stated:
The evidence is conclusive that judges of widely varying attitudes on
sentencing, administering statutes that confer huge measures of discretion, mete out widely divergent sentences where the differences
are explainable only by variations among the judges, not by material
27
differences in defendants or their crimes.

Moreover, some studies reached the damning conclusion
that variables such as the race, gender, and socioeconomic
status of the offender affected sentencing outcomes. 8
ences in offense or offender characteristics); Frankel, supra note 3, at 7-8
(noting that divergent judges' views about sentencing and their differing reactions to particular crimes resulted in wildly unequal sentences for similar
offenses).
25. See Frederick J. Gaudet et al., IndividualDifferences in the Sentencing Tendencies of Judges, 23 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 811, 813-18 (1933)

(finding significant differences in the sentencing tendencies ofjudges in a New
Jersey county).
26. See, e.g., ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & WILLIAM B. ELDRIDGE, THE SECOND
CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY:

A

REPORT TO THE JUDGES OF THE SECOND

CIRCUIT 9 (1974) (finding wide disagreements among Second Circuit judges
about proper sentencing in 20 cases and concluding that in sentencing
"absence of consensus is the norm"); LESLIE T. WILKINS ET AL., SENTENCING
GUIDELINES: STRUCTURING JUDICIAL DISCRETION, REPORT ON THE FEASIBILITY STUDY 1-2, 25-32 (1978) (noting widespread criticisms of disparity in

sentencing and finding that sentencing guidelines can help ensure that judicial discretion is exercised fairly); William Austin & Thomas Williams I, A
Survey of Judges' Responses to Simulated Legal Cases: Research Note on Sentencing Disparity, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 306, 309-10 (1977) (concluding from a study of 47 Virginia district court judges that some form of disparate sentencing across similar cases was always present); Shari Seidman
Diamond & Hans Zeisel, Sentencing Councils: A Study of Sentence Disparity
and Its Reduction, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 109, 144-49 (1975) (finding significant
sentencing disparities, even in jurisdictions with sentencing councils designed
to prevent disparate treatment of offenders).
27. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 21
(1973).

28. See Ilene H. Nagel and John Hagan, Gender and Crime: Offense Patterns and Criminal Court Sanctions, in 4 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL
REVIEw OF RESEARCH 91 (1983). See generally Andrew Hopkins, Is There a

ClassBias in CriminalSentencing?, 42 AM. SOC. REv. 176 (1977) (finding that
a defendant's sentence reflects his socioeconomic status); Joseph C. Howard,
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The evidence that unfettered judicial discretion resulted in
unwarranted sentencing disparity and discrimination generated a consensus among scholars and other criminal justice experts that the country needed a system of mandatory sentencing guidelines to limit judicial discretion and increase
uniformity.29 The work of these scholars and experts soon
prompted a legislative response. In 1975, Senator Edward
Kennedy introduced a comprehensive sentencing reform bill,
proposing that uniform sentencing goals should guide federal
judges and providing for the establishment of a sentencing
guidelines system. 0 Legislators introduced a number of similar bills in the 95th, 96th, and 97th Congresses.3 1 Finally, in
1983, a bipartisan coalition of twenty-three senators introduced S. 668-the bill which ultimately became the Sentencing
32
Reform Act.
Congress sought to achieve the following directives in
adopting the SRA: (1) honesty in sentencing through abolition
of parole and adoption of "real time" sentencing; 33 (2) increased
uniformity in sentencing by reducing sentencing disparities
Racial Discriminationin Sentencing, 59 JUDICATURE 121 (1975) (arguing that
race serves as a determinative factor in sentencing).
29. See Charles Ogletree, The Death of Discretion? Reflecting on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1938, 1944 (1988) (describing
the "general consensus" in Congress and among judges, lawyers, and criminal
justice experts concerning the necessity of uniform sentencing guidelines).
See generally MARVIN FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCING: LAW WITHOUT
ORDER (1973) (explaining inconsistent sentencing patterns in terms of broad
judicial discretion, untempered by a system of uniform sentencing guidelines).
30. See S. 2699, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1975) (proposing the amendment of
Title 18 of the United States Code to establish sentencing guidelines and a
United States Sentencing Commission).
31. See, e.g., S. 1630, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1981) (proposing the
codification, revision, and reformation of Title 18 of the United States Code);
S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1979); S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101
(1977).
32. The Senate Reports series contains the full text of the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1983, the broader reform bill into which Congress incorporated the SRA. See S. REP. No. 225 (1983). This report constitutes the
principal legislative history of the SRA.
33. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, at A3 (1995)
[hereinafter U.S.S.G. (1995)] (articulating both the underlying rationale and
policy of the Guidelines); see also S. REP. No. 225, at 56-57 (stating the Senate
Committee's belief that real time sentencing would increase public respect for
the law, enhance prison rehabilitation efforts, and improve mechanisms for
dealing with prison discipline problems); Edward M. Kennedy, Symposium on
Sentencing, Part1, 7 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1978) (proposing the elimination
of indeterminate sentences to increase fairness and certainty as one major
goal of sentencing reform legislation).
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among defendants with similar criminal records found guilty of
similar criminal conduct; 34 and (3) increased proportionalityin
for
sentencing by imposing appropriately different 3sentences
5
crimes representing different levels of culpability.
Congress's creation of the United States Sentencing
Commission was a key element of the SRA. Congress authorized the Commission to promulgate sentencing guidelines and
policy statements for use by federal courts when imposing
criminal sentences. 36 Although Congress assigned the ultimate
responsibility for drafting the Guidelines to the Commission,
Congress provided substantial guidance, with specific suggestions regarding both form and content. The SRA suggested
that the Guidelines might take the form of a grid that determines sentencing ranges for particular offenses based on the
characteristics of the offender and his offense. 37 Congress intended narrow ranges for sentences involving imprisonment.
By statute, the maximum of any sentencing range could not exceed the minimum of that range
by more than the greater of six
38
months or twenty-five percent.
Congress further required the Commission to examine a
number of offense characteristics to determine the extent of

34. The Senate Committee characterized this reduction in disparity
among similarly situated defendants as a "primary goal of sentencing reform."
S. REP. No. 225, at 52 (discussing the goals of federal sentencing reform); see
U.S.S.G. (1995), supra note 33, ch. 1, pt. A, at A3 (articulating both the underlying rationale and policy of the Guidelines).
35. The Senate Committee Report states that "the use of sentencing
guidelines and policy statements is intended to assure that each sentence is
fair compared to all other sentences." S. REP. No. 225, at 51 (discussing the
goals of federal sentencing reform); see U.S.S.G. (1995), supra note 33, ch. 1,
pt. A, at A3 (articulating both the underlying rationale and policy of the
Guidelines).
36. See 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1994) (discussing the establishment and purposes
of the United States Sentencing Commission).
37. See, e.g., Id. § 994(c)(1)-(7) (detailing seven offense characteristics
relevant to the Commission for establishing categories of offenses); Id. §
994(d)(1)-(11) (detailing eleven offender characteristics relevant to the Commission for establishing categories of defendants).
38. Congress provided:
If a sentence specified by the guidelines includes a term of imprisonment, the maximum of the range established for such term shall not
exceed the minimum of that range by more than the greater of 25%
or 6 months, except that, if the minimum term of the range is 30
years or more, the maximum may be life imprisonment.
Id. § 994(b)(2).
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their relevance to sentencing.39 The SRA listed a number of offender characteristics for the Commission to consider, 4 but
specifically provided that the Guidelines were to be "entirely
neutral as to the race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of offenders. 4'

39. Congress stated, in describing offense characteristics:
The Commission, in establishing categories of offenses for use in the
guidelines and policy statements governing the imposition of sentences... shall consider whether the following matters, among others, have any relevance to the nature, extent, place of service, or
other incidents of an appropriate sentence, and shall take them into
account only to the extent that they do have relevance(1) the grade of the offense;
(2) the circumstances under which the offense was committed...;
(3) the nature and degree of the harm caused by the offense...;
(4) the community view of the gravity of the offense;
(5) the public concern generated by the offense;
(6) the deterrent effect a particular sentence may have on the commission of the offense by others; and
(7) the current incidence of the offense in the community and in the
Nation as a whole.
Id. § 994(c). The Commission, of course, remains free to determine that any of
the listed characteristics should not play a role in sentencing, and draft the
Guidelines accordingly. See S. REP. No. 225, at 169 (discussing the role of the
Commission in determining relevant factors for sentencing).
40. The SRA provided:
The Commission in establishing categories of defendants for use in
the guidelines and policy statements governing imposition of sentences ... shall consider whether the following matters, among others, with respect to a defendant, have any relevance to the nature,
extent, place of service, or other incidents of an appropriate sentence,
and shall take them into account only to the extent that they do have
relevance(1) age;
(2) education;
(3) vocational sidlIs;
(4) mental and emotional condition to the extent that such condition
mitigates the defendanfs culpability or to the extent that such condition is otherwise plainly relevant;
(5) physical condition, including drug dependence;
(6) previous employment record;
(7) family ties and responsibilities;
(8) community ties;
(9) role in the offense;
(10) criminal history; and
(11) degree of dependence upon criminal activity for a livelihood.
The Commission shall assure that the guidelines and policy statements are entirely neutral as to the race, sex, national origin, creed,
and socioeconomic status of offenders.
28 U.S.C. § 994(d).
41. Id.
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In addition to these directives to the Commission, the SRA
specified in § 3553(a) how sentencing judges were to use the
Guidelines in fashioning sentences by setting out the factors a
judge must consider. These factors were: (1) the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the purposes of sentencing; (3) the
range of available sentencing alternatives; (4) the applicable
Guidelines sentence; (5) any pertinent policy statements issued
by the Commission; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencand (7) the need to provide restitution to vicing disparities;
42
tims.

Section 3553(b) requires the sentencing judge to impose a
sentence consistent with the Guidelines. It adds a proviso,
however, that the judge may "depart" outside the applicable
Guidelines range if there are aggravating or mitigating circumstances present that the Commission did not adequately
consider when formulating the Guidelines, and when the presence of such aggravating or mitigating circumstances demands
a sentence different from that specified in the Guidelines.4 3
When a judge departs from the sentencing Guidelines, the SRA
requires the judge to state on the record the reasons for the departure.44 This statement of reasons provides the groundwork
for appellate review of departures. 5

42. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1994).
43. Section 3553(b) states:
The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range,
referred to in subsection (a)(4) [the guidelines sentencing range issued by the Commission] unless the court finds that there exists an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different
from that described.
Id. § 3553(b).
44. See Id. § 3553(c)(2) (stating that judges must provide "specific reasons" for a sentence that falls outside of the scheme of the Guidelines).
45. See Id. § 3742(a)-(b) (articulating the requirements for an appeal of a
departed sentence by either a defendant or the government). 18 U.S.C. §
3742(a) provides that a defendant may appeal "an otherwise final sentence" if
the sentence "was imposed for an offense for which a sentencing guideline has
been issued by the Sentencing Commission... and the sentence is greater
than the sentence specified in the applicable guideline." Similarly, under 18
U.S.C. § 3742(b), the government may appeal a sentence "imposed for an offense for which a sentencing guideline has been issued by the Sentencing
Commission.. . and the sentence is less than the sentence specified in the
applicable guideline."
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B. THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND THE ROLE OF
DEPARTURES

President Reagan signed the SRA into law on October 12,
1984. After a lengthy period of empirical research on federal
sentencing practices, public hearings, drafting, and debate, the
Commission promulgated its initial Guidelines,' which went
into effect on November 1, 1987. Particular provisions of the
Guidelines have evolved substantially since the Guidelines'
initial promulgation; the Commission has adopted over 500
amendments since 1987.46 The essential structure of the
Guidelines has, however, remained constant.
The Guidelines employ a matrix (Sentencing Table), with
the applicable sentencing range derived from an intersection of
the defendant's "total offense level" and "criminal history category."47 The judge calculates the total offense level, represented by the vertical axis of the Sentencing Table, by determining the defendant's "base offense level," which is derived
from the offense of conviction. The judge then makes adjustments to that base offense level in light of various indicators of
the real offense conduct and other additional adjustments
noted in Chapter Three of the Guidelines Manual. 8 The crimi-

nal history category, represented by the horizontal axis of the
46. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL App. C (1994) [hereinafter
U.S.S.G. (1994)] (listing the text and effective date of each amendment promulgated since the issuance of the Guidelines in October of 1987).
47. See U.S.S.G. (1995), supra note 33, § 5A (presenting the November
1995 version of the Sentencing Table).
48. Id. As an example, a defendant convicted of bank robbery under 18
U.S.C. § 2113(a) has a base offense level of 20 under the applicable robbery
guideline. Id. § 2B3.1. The robbery guideline contains a number of specific offense characteristics which affect the offense level. For example, it provides
for a two-point enhancement if the robbery involves a financial institution.
Id. § 2B3.1(b)(1). If, in the course of the offense, a firearm was brandished,
displayed or possessed, the offense level is increased by five points. Id. §
2B3.1(b)(2). If any victim suffered bodily injury, the offense level is increased
by two to six points, depending upon the extent of the injury. Id. §
2B3.1(b)(3)(A)-(E). If the loss to the bank is greater than $10,000 but less
than $50,000, another point is added. Id. § 2B3.1(b)(6). Chapter Three contains a number of generally applicable adjustments. See, e.g., id. § 3A1.1-1.4
(outlining victim-related adjustments); id. § 3B1.1-1.4 (articulating adjustments related to the defendant's role in the offense); id. § 3C1.1-1.2 (detailing
adjustments imposed for the obstruction of justice); id. § 3D1.1-1.5 (outlining
adjustments for multiple counts); id. § 3E1.1 (discussing adjustments imposed
for defendant's acceptance of responsibility). If our hypothetical bank robbery
defendant brandished a firearm, punched a teller in the face causing minor
injury, and fled with $40,000, and no Chapter Three adjustments applied, the
total offense level would be 30.

312

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:299

seriousness of
Sentencing Table, is based on the number and
4 9
the defendant's sentences for prior convictions.
The intersection of the total offense level and criminal history category on the Sentencing Table matrix determines the
applicable Guidelines sentencing range. This point on the Sentencing Table yields a range expressed in months of imprisonment.5 0 Under § 3553(b), the sentencing judge must impose a
sentence from within that range unless there are present aggravating or mitigating circumstances, not adequately taken
into account by the Commission in formulating the Guidelines,
and the presence of such circumstances warrants a sentence
outside the Guidelines' range.5 1 The following example demonstrates how the departure provision might work.
Assume a bank robbery defendant 52 was the girlfriend of a
co-conspirator in the bank robbery. Assume further that at
sentencing she is able to introduce credible evidence that her
boyfriend coerced her into participating in the bank robbery,
either through intimidation or threats of violence if she refused. This type of duress, although perhaps insufficient to
constitute a complete defense on the merits, arguably could
qualify as a mitigating factor for sentencing purposes. 3 The
Guidelines do not contain an adjustment for duress in either
Chapter Two or Chapter Three; however, Chapter Five contains a policy statement which suggests that duress or coercion
49. Thus, if our hypothetical bank robber had one prior bank robbery
conviction which had resulted in a prison sentence of two years, he would receive three criminal history points pursuant to section 4Al.1(a) of the Guidelines, placing him in Criminal History Category II. See id. § 4A1.1(a) (requiring the imposition of three additional points in the criminal history category
for each prior sentence of imprisonment).
50. In our bank robbery example in footnote 48, the defendant's total offense level of 30 and criminal history category of II results in a Guidelines
sentence of 108 to 135 months.
51. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (explaining how judges should apply the
Guidelines when imposing a sentence). As we discuss below, there is some
dispute about whether a court may depart from the Guidelines range if the
requirements of § 3553(b) are not met. See infra notes 88-98 and accompanying text (noting various interpretations of interaction between § 3553(a) and §
3553(b)). Appellate courts, however, overwhelmingly have concluded that a
departure must be premised on § 3553(b). See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (noting that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) requires the satisfaction of various elements for proper departure from the Guidelines).
52. Refer to example supra notes 48-50.
53. See United States v. Johnson, 956 F.2d 894, 897-98 (9th Cir. 1992)
(permitting departure for duress where defendant failed to make a showing
equivalent to that required for a complete defense).

1996]

SENTENCING GUIDELINES DEPARTURES

313

qualifies as a permissible basis for departure.14 Thus, duress
constitutes a mitigating factor, not adequately taken into account in calculating the Guidelines sentencing range, which
may warrant a sentence below the 108-month minimum
Guidelines sentence. In this example, § 3553(b)5 authorizes the
court to depart from the sentencing Guidelines.
The Commission's statements dealing with departures
demonstrate that it recognizes both the need for departures
and their potential for reintroducing disparity and discrimination if abused. On one hand, the Commission reasoned that no
set of Guidelines could adequately account for all of the factors
relevant to sentencing in every case.5 6 To avoid excessive uni54. See U.S.S.G. (1995), supra note 33, § 5K2.12 (recognizing duress as a
grounds for departure from the Guidelines, but only such duress involving
threat of physical injury, substantial damage to property, or similar injury resulting from the unlawful action of a third party or natural emergency).
55. It must be emphasized that a court is not required to depart, and a
discretionary decision not to depart is not subject to appellate review. See
United States v. Ocasio, 914 F.2d 330, 333 (1st Cir. 1990) (citing United
States v. Ruiz, 905 F.2d 499 (1st Cir. 1990)), for the proposition that "absent
extraordinary circumstances, a criminal defendant cannot ground appeal on
the district court's discretionary decision not to undertake a downward departure from the sentencing range indicated by the guidelines"). Moreover, the
extent of the departure is largely within the sentencing judge's discretion, and
is reviewed only for "reasonableness." Id.
The court of appeals shall give due regard to the opportunity of the
district court to judge the credibility of witnesses, and shall accept
the findings of fact of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous and shall give due deference to the district court's application
of the guidelines to the facts.
18 U.S.C. § 3742. This standard is quite deferential. See United States v.
Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 49-50 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 177
(1990) (noting that "appellate review must occur with full awareness of, and
respect for, the trier's superior 'feel' for the case" and that "[courts] will not
lightly disturb decisions to depart, or not, or related decisions implicating degrees of departure"). In our example, a court might plausibly depart to a sentence of 80 months, 24 months, or even probation. Appellate courts seem
averse to reversing departures, especially downward departures, on the
ground that the extent of departure was unreasonable. See infra Part III
(analyzing appellate departure jurisprudence).
56. See U.S.S.G. (1995), supra note 33, ch. 1, pt. A, at 1 (acknowledging
that "it is difficult to prescribe a single set of guidelines that encompasses the
vast range of human conduct potentially relevant to a sentencing decision").
Thus, the Commission designed the Guidelines to be modified over time, and
the Commission contemplated that information gathered through departure
analyses would be important in furthering the evolution of the Guidelines. As
the Commission explained in its initial manual:
The Commission is a permanent body, empowered by law to write
and rewrite guidelines, with progressive changes, over many years.
By monitoring when courts depart from the guidelines and by analyz-
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formityf a Guidelines system, where warranted by truly unusual fact situations, must leave the court some leeway to impose a sentence outside the Guidelines range. On the other
hand, the availability of departures undermines, to some extent, the uniformity sought by adopting binding Guidelines.
Judges are not required to depart when faced with apparently
atypical fact situations, and different judges may respond in
varying fashions to a request for departure.5 8 Moreover, since
departures are by definition discretionary, the extent of departure may vary dramatically, depending on the judge. In short,
departures permit individual judges to exercise discretion; if
exercised appropriately, departures ensure proportionality,
and they provide needed flexibility and balance to a mandatory
Guidelines system. If, however, judges use departures to impose sentences according to their own ideals, the disparity
which prompted Congress to enact the SRA will be reintroduced.
The Commission's challenge was to enact a set of provisions that would allow judges to exercise a limited amount of
discretion within the framework of the Guidelines. The Commission characterized its view of the proper role of departures
in the following manner:
The Commission intends the sentencing courts to treat each guideline
as carving out a "heartland," a set of typical cases embodying the
conduct that each guideline describes. When a court finds an atypical
case, one to which a particular guideline linguistically applies but
where conduct significantly differs from the norm, the court may
consider whether a departure is warranted.5 9

ing their stated reasons for doing so and court decisions with references thereto, the Commission, over time, will be able to refine the
guidelines to specify more precisely when departures should and
should not be permitted.
Id. at 6.
57. This refers to the unwarranted treatment of unlike cases in a like
manner. As Professor Stephen Schulhofer notes, excessive uniformity is still
a problem under the Guidelines scheme due to a number of factors, including
the prevalence of quantity-based mandatory minimum sentences in drug trafficking cases. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing
Process:The Problem Is Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 833,
851-70 (1992) (noting excessive uniformity in drug cases and Guidelines sentences generally).
58. See, e.g., David N. Yellen, Two Cheers for a Tale of Three Cities, 66 S.
CAL. L. REV. 567, 572 (1992) ("A factor that persuades one judge to depart
from the guidelines may not convince another judge faced with an essentially
identical defendant.").
59. U.S.S.G. (1995), supra note 33, ch. 1, pt. A, at 5-6.

1996]

SENTENCING GUIDELINES DEPARTURES

315

Because the Commission felt it had accounted for most
significant sentencing factors, it believed departures would
rarely be needed. 0
The Commission recognized that departures could take different forms. Some departures are "guided"-that is, a guideline or related commentary suggests that a departure of a certain amount may be warranted under certain circumstances.
The Guidelines Manual recommends, 61 for example, a downward adjustment of eight levels when the offense was not
committed for profit and did not involve physical force or coercion.62 Guided departures do not implicate the concerns associated with unguided departures because they are designed to
apply in fairly specific fact situations, articulated by the
Commission, and the Commission specifies the extent of departures. Although the sentencing judge must make the factual
determination as to the applicability of these guided departures to any particular case, there is relatively little discretion
and, consequently, little risk of introducing disparity." Such
guided departures are more akin to adjustments, such as those
in Chapters Two and Three, which judges use to calculate the
applicable Guidelines range, rather than a departure from the
Guidelines range.
Unguided departures-those for which the sentencing
judge determines both applicability and magnitude-present
more difficulty because they highlight the tension between the
60. Id. at 6 ("[The Commission believes that despite the courts' legal
freedom to depart from the guidelines, they will not do so very often... because the guidelines, offense by offense, seek to take account of those factors
that the Commission's data indicate made a significant difference in preguidelines sentencing practice.").
61. This reference is entitled, "Transportation for the Purpose of Prostitution or Prohibited Sexual Conduct." U.S.S.G. (1995), supra note 33, §
2G1.1.
62. U.S.S.G. (1995), supra note 33, § 2G1.1, at 6.
63. A similar analysis applies to a second type of departure that the
Commission identified-interpolation between numerically oriented Guidelines. Id. ch. 1, pt. A, at 6. The example cited by the Commission is an offense
characteristic providing for a four level increase in offense level for serious
bodily injury, and a two level increase for bodily injury. Id. (referring to offenses such as assault or burglary as examples). The Commission's commentary suggests that in appropriate cases, a court might select an intermediate
increase of three levels. See id. § 2A2.1(b)(1) (allowing for an increase of three
levels if the bodily injuries should be categorized between life-threatening and
serious). Like the guided departure, such interpolation does not risk serious
disparity because judicial discretion is exercised within a narrow range, and
in limited circumstances.
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need for judicial discretion and sentencing flexibility, and the
desire to limit discretion in order to reduce disparity. Judges
may base unguided departures on grounds the Commission
identified or on circumstances wholly unforeseen by the Commission. Such departures are generally the focus of the debate
regarding the amount of judicial discretion preserved by departures and, consequently, are the focus of this Article.
The general departure provisions of the Guidelines appear
in sections 5K2.0 through 5K2.16 of the Guidelines Manual.
Section 5K2.0 provides a general description of the Commission's view on the appropriate use of departures. It tracks the
general departure language Congress used in 18 U.S.C. §
3553(b), providing that a sentencing court may depart "if the
court finds 'that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating
the Guidelines that should result in a sentence different from
that described.' ""
Section 5K2.0 suggests that the Commission contemplated
two distinct types of departures--"qualitative"
and
"quantitative."" Qualitative departures involve aggravating or
mitigating circumstances "of a kind" not taken into consideration by the Commission in formulating the Guidelines.6 6 As
the Commission recognized, possible bases for such departures
could not be determined in advance;6 7 therefore, the Commission set out in sections 5K2.1-2.16 a number of bases for departure which were not factored into the basic Guidelines calculations. These included such aggravating factors as death, 68
physical injury, 69 extreme psychological injury,7" and such miti64. Id. § 5K2.0. The language of the original § 5K2.0 was slightly different, permitting departure "if the court finds that an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance exists that was not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines." U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 (1987). Congress amended § 5K2.0, effective
June 15, 1988, to reflect its 1987 revision of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C. at 28-29 (1989); see infra notes 123141 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's revision of § 3553(b)).
65. See Selya and Kipp, supra note 15, at 22 (using the terms "qualitative" and "quantitative" to describe two different types of departures).
66. See id. (describing qualitative departures).
67. See U.S.S.G. (1994), supra note 46, § 5K2.0 ("Circumstances that may
warrant departure from the guidelines pursuant to this provision cannot, by
their very nature, be comprehensively listed and analyzed in advance.").
68. Id. § 5K2.1.
69. Id. § 5K2.2.
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gating factors as victim conduct,7 coercion or duress,72 and diminished capacity." Generally, the Commission did not account for the presence of these factors in formulating the
Guidelines ranges,74 and their presence would render a case
sufficiently atypical to make it a candidate for departure.
Both Congress and the Commission also contemplated
quantitative departures-those based on a factor that is present "to a degree" not adequately considered by the Commission
in formulating the Guidelines ranges.7 5 These quantitative departures commonly involve certain offender characteristics
that the Commission has taken into account to the extent they
are deemed not ordinarily relevant 76 Examples of these include age, physical condition,78 mental and emotional condition,7 9 and family or community ties or responsibilities. 0 When
such characteristics are present to an unusual degree, departure may be warranted.8 '
In short, departures come in a variety of forms, and may
be based on a virtually unlimited variety of grounds. The
treatment of these varied departures in the appellate caselaw
and at the district court level has significant implications for
federal sentencing policy and the effectiveness of the Guidelines in meeting the goals set out in the SRA. Whether departures are playing their intended role in furthering the policy
goals of the Guidelines scheme is the subject of considerable
controversy. Before approaching that question, we turn to a
critical question of interpretation underlying the departure de70. Id. § 5K2.3.
71. Id. § 5K2.10.
72. Id. § 5K2.12.
73. Id. § 5K2.13.
74. This is true as a general matter, but not in every type of case. For instance, if one of the Chapter 2A homicide Guidelines is applied, the Commission obviously accounted for the death of the victim, and departure under §
5K2.1 would be inappropriate.
75. See Selya & Kipp, supra note 15, at 22 (describing quantitative departures).
76. See id. at 23 (acknowledging that normally irrelevant characteristics
of defendant may warrant departure in certain circumstances).
77. U.S.S.G. (1994), supra note 46, § 5H1.1.
78. Id. § 5H1.4.
79. Id. § 5H1.3.
80. Id. § 5H1.6.
81. See, e.g., United States v. Mogel, 956 F.2d 1555, 1561, 1564 (11th Cir.
1992) (holding that in extraordinary circumstances a court may rely on one of
the factors in § 5H1 to depart from the Guidelines range).
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bate: Precisely what role was departure intended to play in
Guidelines sentencing?
C. DEPARTURES AND FLEXIBILITY IN SENTENCING: DIVERGENT

VIEWS
In drafting the Guidelines, the Commission attempted to
walk a fine line between excessive uniformity and excessive
flexibility in sentencing. The availability of departures serves
as a crucial safety valve, permitting flexibility in a scheme
primarily designed to limit judges' discretion and impose some
manner of uniformity in sentencing. Thus, the scope of the departure provision serves as the key battleground between those
urging greater uniformity and those urging greater flexibility. 82
It should come as no surprise that competing conceptions
have arisen regarding the proper scope of the SRA's departure
provisions. On one side of the debate, commentators urge extensive use of departure to individualize sentences, particularly to permit sentences less severe than those the Guidelines
impose. One of the proponents of a more extensive use of departure, Judge Vincent Broderick, has used a sports analogy to
exhort his colleagues to assert their departure authority.
"Spectators at New York Knicks games in the late 1960s used
to chant: 'Defense! Defense! Defense!' Today's message for
sentencing judges is: 'Depart! Depart! Depart!' Departures
are the lifeblood of the Guidelines process."83 Others, though in
somewhat less colorful language, have also urged more ag84
gressive use of departures.
On the opposite side of the debate, there are others, including a number of appellate judges, who have a less expansive
view of the departure authority of sentencing judges.8" As one
82. See supra note 12 (citing articles that criticize the Guidelines as too
inflexible).
83. Conference on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Summary of Proceedings, 101 YALE L.J. 2053, 2070 (1992) (remarks of Judge Vincent L. Broderick, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York).
84. See, e.g., Clarke and McFadden, supra note 14, at 927-32 (interpreting
the SRA to promote greater flexibility for courts to depart than prevailing
caselaw permitted); Daniel J. Freed, FederalSentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: UnacceptableLimits on the Discretionof Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681,
1728-38 (1992) (criticizing appellate courts for reversing downward departures too frequently).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 930 F.2d 526, 530-31 (7th Cir.
1991) (agreeing with courts that read § 5H1.6 narrowly); Andrew von Hirsch,
Federal Sentencing Guidelines:Do They ProvidePrincipledGuidance?, 27 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 367, 370 (1989) (criticizing departure rules as too loose).
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appellate court stated, departure "must be restricted to those
few instances where some substantial atypicality can be demonstrated."8 6
Courts traditionally have focused on legislative intent as
the key to statutory interpretation.8 7 In keeping with this view,
in this section we seek to discern how Congress intended departures to function. Our review of the structure, text, and
legislative history of the SRA persuades us that departures
were not intended as an all-purpose escape hatch from the
Guidelines as some proponents of a liberal departure standard
have suggested. Rather, Congress intended departures to be
used relatively rarely, reserved for cases in which either the offense, behavior, or relevant circumstances of the defendant are
meaningfully atypical.
1. Departure Language in the SRA
The most specific provision in the SRA governing a sentencing judge's decision to depart from the Guidelines range is
§ 3553(b), which provides:
The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range,
[specified by the Commission in its guidelines] unless the court finds
that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind,
or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result
in a sentence different from that described. 88

This language appears to create a straightforward requirement. In the absence of specific, atypical circumstances,
the sentencing judge must impose a sentence from within the
range that the Commission authorized. While some may dispute what the Commission considered in formulating the
Guidelines and whether its consideration was "adequate," it is
apparent that this provision assumes the presumptive nature
of the Guidelines sentence. It also assumes that, absent some
unusual circumstance, the twenty-five percent spread in the
Guidelines sentencing range provides courts with enough
86. United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 962, 967 (1st Cir. 1989).
87. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 214 (1984) (stating
that the "sole task" of statutory interpretation is to determine legislative intent); 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.05
(4th ed. 1984) (stating that the intent of the legislature is the criterion most
often cited as the basis for interpreting statutes). But see WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 13-47 (1994) (criticizing
the focus on legislative intent as the principal basis for statutory interpretation).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994).
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flexibility to individualize sentences for offenders
whose crimi89
nal conduct and criminal history are similar.
Some commentators have argued that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)
is inconsistent with other provisions of the SRA, specifically §§
3553(a) and 3551, and that the latter sections provide an alternative basis for departure.9 ° These commentators cite two key
elements for departure authority under § 3553(a): the parsimony language of the first sentence of § 3553(a) 91 and the sequencing of issues that the sentencing judge should consider in
imposing sentences. 92 First, the parsimony language suggests
that a sentencing judge who concludes that any sentence
within the range is greater than necessary to satisfy the purposes of sentencing may depart on that basis.93 Second, the se89. Thus, for example, the Guidelines system created by Congress presumes that two first-time offenders convicted of bank robbery, each of whom
displayed but did not use a weapon, should not receive sentences that differ
by more than 25%, even if they have different family ties, educational backgrounds, or employment histories. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (1994) (requiring
a 25% range between the minimum and maximum sentence under the Guidelines); Id. § 994(e) (indicating the "general inappropriateness" of education,
employment record, and family ties in sentencing).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Davern, 937 F.2d 1041, 1043-46 (6th Cir.
1991); United States v. Concepcion, 795 F. Supp. 1262, 1275-82 (E.D.N.Y.
1992) (noting that courts tend to ignore §§ 3551 and 3553(a) and discussing
the importance of those sections); Clarke & McFadden, supra note 14, at 92931 (suggesting § 3553(a) provides independent departure authority); Freed,
supra note 84, at 1709 (explaining how a court could base a departure on the
purposes outlined in § 3553(a) or the failure of the Commission to adequately
consider a factor, as allowed in § 3553(b)).
91. "The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to comply with the [four basic purposes of sentencing] set forth in
paragraph (2) of this subsection." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); SentencingAlternatives
and Procedures,in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 18-3.2(iii) (1993)
("Parsimony in the use of punishment is favored. The sentence imposed
should therefore be the least severe sanction necessary to achieve the purposes for which it is imposed.").
We will refer to the § 3553(a) language quoted above as the "parsimony"
language, as have others. See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, The UncertainFuture of
Sentencing Guidelines, 12 LAW & INEQ. J. 1, 20 (1993) (using "parsimony" as
short-hand reference for notion that penal sanctions should be the least severe necessary to achieve the purposes of sentencing).
92. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(7) (1994) (instructing the sentencing court
to consider: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the four purposes of sentencing; (3)
the kinds of sentences available; (4) the Guidelines range established by the
Commission; (5) the Commission's policy statements; (6) the need to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (7) the need to provide restitution to
the victim(s) of the offense).
93. See, e.g., Davern, 937 F.2d at 1043-44 ("18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) ... provides in mandatory language in the first sentence that the District Court
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quencing of factors the sentencing judge should consider is of
particular importance. The Commission's Guidelines and policy statements are but two of seven factors for the sentencing
judge's consideration. Further, they are listed only after consideration of relevant offense and offender characteristics, sentencing purposes, and kinds of sentences available. As Clarke
and McFadden argue, "Given the legal principle that a statute
must be read to give meaning to each of its parts, subsection (a)
Had Congress meant for subsecmust have some meaning ....
tion (b) to be the only guide for sentencing courts, it would not
have adopted subsection (a)."94 Further, courts cite the language of § 3551, which instructs courts to impose sentences to
achieve the four basic purposes of sentencing articulated in §
3553(a)(2), 9' to bolster the argument that the judge should impose a sentence the judge individually decides is consistent
rather than reflexively looking
with the purposes of sentencing,
96
to the Guidelines range.
Requiring a judge to determine a sentence initially by reference only to the Guidelines range and policy statements appears inconsistent with the structure and sequence of §
3553(a). Some commentators, however, have noted that the
sequence of the factors to be considered does not necessarily establish the priority of those factors.97 Moreover, permitting
judges to depart on the basis of §§ 3551 and 3553(a) effectively
negates § 3553(b), which instructs judges to impose a Guidelines sentence, absent the presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances not considered by the Commission. This
evisceration of § 3553(b) violates the same interpretive canon
upon which Clarke and McFadden rely.
should consider the facts and fix a sentence 'not greater than necessary to
comply' with [the stated purposes]").
94. Clarke & McFadden, supra note 14, at 929 (citations omitted).
95. See 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a) (1994) ("[A] defendant who has been found
guilty... shall be sentenced in accordance with the provisions of this chapter
so as to achieve the purposes set forth in subparagraphs (A) through (D) of
section 3553(a)(2) ... ."); id. § 3553(a)(A)-(D) (outlining the purposes of sentencing to include just punishment, deterrence, public protection, and rehabilitation).
96. See United States v. Concepcion, 795 F. Supp. 1262, 1275-76 (E.D.N.Y.
1992) (emphasizing the importance of § 3553(a) in conjunction with § 3551 in
determining the effect of the Guidelines).
97. See, e.g., Leonard J. Long, Miller's Algebra of Purposesat Sentencing,
66 S. CAL. L. REv. 483, 490 (1992) ("But, the fact that the purposes are listed
prior to the guidelines and presumptive sentence in the sequential order of
judicial consideration does not establish that purposes have priority in either
importance or weight....").
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Appellate courts interpreting the departure provisions
have noted the apparent tension between subsections (a) and
(b), but have harmonized these provisions by reading § 3553(a)
to permit the sentencing judge to consider the non-Guidelines
factors specified in that provision when imposing a sentence
within the Guidelines range.98 This interpretation, adopted by
the vast majority of courts addressing the issue, appears to be
the most natural reading of these provisions, given the clear
directive in § 3553(b) to impose a sentence from within the
Guidelines range, absent special aggravating or mitigating circumstances. As this Article's next section shows, this reading
is also most consistent with the SRA's legislative history and
the central policies underlying its adoption.
2. Legislative History of the SRA's Departure Language
One can trace the SRA's origins back to S. 2699, a sentencing reform measure introduced by Senator Kennedy in 1975. 99
The next nine years produced several sentencing reform bills,
extensive hearings, committee reports, and floor debates, as
both houses of Congress considered various sentencing reform
bills and aspects of federal sentencing and criminal code reform.
The Senate Judiciary Committee reported, and the Senate
passed, sentencing reform bills in 1977,100 1980,101 1981,102 and
1983.13 From the beginning, however, the House's vision of
sentencing reform differed significantly from the Senate's.'"
Throughout this period, the House, critical of the Senate's
98. See, e.g., United States v. Boshell, 952 F.2d 1101, 1106-07 (9th Cir.
1991) (allowing for consideration of offender characteristics in adjusting sentences within the Guidelines, but only allowing departures outside the range
in extraordinary circumstances). But see Concepcion, 795 F. Supp. at 1278
(arguing that selection of a point within the Guidelines range does not permit
the sentencing judge to engage in full consideration of the factors specified in
§ 3553(a)).
99. S. 2699, 94th Cong. (1975).
100. S. 1437, 95th Cong. (1977).
101. S. 1722, 96th Cong. (1980).
102. S. 1630, 97th Cong. (1981).
103. S. 668, 98th Cong. (1983); S. 1762, 98th Cong. (1983). The latter bill
included the Sentencing Reform Act, which the House ultimately adopted as
part of an appropriations measure, and which President Reagan signed in
1984.
104. See Robert Drinan et al., The FederalCriminal Code: The Houses are
Divided, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 509, 525-31 (1981) (discussing the House's opposition to S. 1437).
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10 6
bills, ' 5 reported alternative sentencing reform measures.
This different vision was reflected in the House's refusal to act
on the Senate-sponsored reform legislation before the SRA's
adoption, 0 and in the bills debated and adopted by the House
during that time. For example, a bill reported to the House
floor in 1980 provided for flexible, non-binding guidelines,
promulgated under the aegis of the Judicial Conference of the
United States and a body wholly comprised of judges.'08 These
aspects of the House's approach contrast sharply with the approach the Senate ultimately adopted, which emphasized comprehensive, binding guidelines promulgated by an independent
body of experts, including both judges and non-judges. 10 9 The
vast difference in approaches adopted by the House and the
Senate may have stifled the debate on the role of departures
and contributed to the lack of clarity on the role of departures
in the SRA's final version.
The lengthy history of the SRA and its numerous predecessor bills produced surprisingly little debate on the role of
departures."0 Senator Hart introduced the provision eventually adopted as § 3553(b) on January 23, 1978."' The Senate,

105. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 98-1017, at 32-34 (1984) (outlining historical
background of House and Senate sentencing reform bills); H.R. REP. No. 961396, at 7-10 (1980) (indicating history of congressional action on sentencing
reform); SUBcOMMITEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
THE JUDICIARY, 95TH CONG.,

REPORT ON RECODIFICATION OF FEDERAL

CRIMINAL LAW 1-5 (Comm. Print 1978) (discussing problems with S. 1437 and
concluding that "the bill is seriously flawed").
106. For examples of sentencing reform bills considered by the House see
H.R. 6012, 98th Cong. (1984); H.R. 6915, 96th Cong. (1980); and H.R. 6869,
95th Cong. (1978).
107. Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The
LegislativeHistory of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 223, 260 (1993); see, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 98-1017, at 32-34 (1984) (outlining historical background of House and Senate sentencing reform bills);
H.R. REP. No. 96-1396, at 7-10 (1980) (indicating history of congressional action on sentencing reform).
108. See H.R. 6915, 96th Cong. § 3103(d) (1980) (stating that a court can
depart from Guidelines upon finding any aggravating or mitigating circumstances); H.R. REP. No. 96-1396 (1980) (discussing the role and composition of
the Judicial Conference).
109. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994) (authorizing departure only when the
court finds an aggravating or mitigating circumstance that the Commission
did not adequately consider).
110. The proper scope of § 3553(b) received more extensive consideration
in 1987 when that section was amended. See infra notes 127-141 and accompanying text (explaining how the 1987 debate sheds light on the intent of the
SRA's drafters).
111. 124 CONG. REC. 382-83 (1978).
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viewing the provision as relatively uncontroversial, only briefly
debated this language, as the following Congressional Record
excerpt indicates.
Mr. HART: This is a very simple and straightforward amendment
that accomplishes exactly what the bill set out to do. That is, it says
that a judge shall sentence a convicted offender within the guidelines
established by the sentencing commission unless there are aggravating or mitigating circumstances of an extraordinary nature; then,
that he must report what those circumstances are in deviating from
the guidelines laid down by the sentencing commission. That is exactly what the purpose of this measure that we are presently debating is. Yet nowhere in the language of the pending legislation does it
specifically state the fact.
Mr. KENNEDY: [Tihis is, again, completely consistent with the
thrust of the legislation... We want to make sure these guidelines
are followed in the great majority of cases. I think this amendment...
makes that more specific ....
Mr. STEVENS: It is my interpretation, as a country lawyer, giving
[sic] the trial judge back some of his authority. Is that right or
wrong?
Mr. HART: No more and no less than the intent of the committee in
offering this bill ....
Mr. STEVENS: If the trial judge finds that the guidelines, or the sentencing commission in formulating the guidelines, did not take into
account circumstances that would either aggravate or mitigate the
situation before him, he can deviate from the range provided in subsection 84?
Mr. HART: I would state it the other way around. That is to say, the
presumption is that the judge will sentence within the guidelines unless there are aggravatingor mitigating circumstances, which is the
2
purpose of this bill.'

The language added by Senator Hart in 1978 survived, essentially unchanged, through the SRA's passage in 1984."1
As the statements of Senator Hart and Senator Kennedy
indicate, the principal proponents of sentencing reform legislation believed that § 3553(b), with its emphasis on the presumptive nature of the Guidelines, was consistent with the
central policies and purposes of sentencing reform. The Senate's express rejection in 1983 of an amendment offered by

112. Id. at 383 (emphasis added).
113. It was amended in 1987 to add the "of a kind or to a degree" language
discussed infra text accompanying note 138. This amendment occasioned a
vigorous debate between members of the House and members of the Senate
about the original meaning of § 3553(a) and (b). See infra notes 127-141 and
accompanying text (outlining the 1987 debate).
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Senator Mathias, which was intended to facilitate departures,
supports this view:
The Committee rejected an amendment by Senator Mathias which
would have expanded significantly the circumstances under which
judges could depart from the sentencing guidelines in a particular
case. The Mathias amendment would have permitted deviations
from the guidelines whenever a judge determined that the characteristics of the offender or the circumstances of the offense warranted
deviation, whether or not the Sentencing Commission had considered
such offense and offender characteristics in the development of the
sentencing guidelines. The Committee resisted this attempt to make
the sentencing guidelines more voluntary than mandatory, because of
the poor record of States
. . . which have experimented with
4

"voluntary" guidelines.'

In other words, the Committee viewed expansion of departure as a threat to the uniformity sought by charging a single
body, the Commission, with the task of determining the role of
key offense and offender characteristics in sentencing and determining the appropriate sentence for each offense/offender
combination.
Still other portions of the 1983 Senate Report, the SRA's
principal legislative history, further emphasize the relatively
narrow intended scope of § 3553(b). Noting that "a primary
goal of sentencing reform is the elimination of unwarranted
sentencing disparity," the Report states that "the bill seeks to
assure that most cases will result in sentences within the
Guidelines range and that sentences outside the Guidelines
will be imposed only in appropriate cases.""' 5 How many cases
is "most" cases? The Committee believed that, based on the
United States Parole Commission's experience with its guidelines, that departure would be appropriate in as many as
twenty percent of cases, possibly less, depending upon the level
of detail of the Guidelines."16
The United States Parole Commission currently sets prison release
dates outside its guidelines in about 20 percent of the cases in its jurisdiction... It is anticipated that judges will impose sentences outside the sentencing guidelines at about the same rate or possibly at a
somewhat lower rate since the sentencing guidelines should contain
recommendations of appropriate sentences for more detailed combinations of offense
and offender characteristics than do the parole
17
guidelines.

114.
115.
116.
117.

S. REP. No. 98-225, at 79 (1983).
Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
Id. at 52 n.71.
Id.
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Regardless of the precise departure frequency anticipated
by the Committee, the Senate bill contemplated presumptive
guidelines, with judicial departures reserved only for exceptional or atypical cases.
As stated, the House pursued a different type of sentencing reform. In 1984, the House Judiciary Committee reported
H.R. 6012, which authorized merely advisory guidelines and
contained the parsimony language of current § 3553(a).' 18
House Republicans opposed H.R. 6012, and urged adoption of
the Senate bill." 9 The text of the Senate's bill was passed and
120
forwarded as part of a continuing appropriations resolution.
On October 4, 1984, the Senate passed the continuing resolution with a handful of amendments, which in turn were
adopted in conference by the House. One of these amendments
is the source of much of the current debate over the meaning of
§ 3553(a) and (b). The amendment involved the incorporation
into subsection (a) of the parsimony language from the House's
bill, H.R. 6012.121 It is not entirely clear why the Senate
adopted this language. 22 In any event, the Senate apparently
did not realize that this language could be viewed as inconsistent with the language of § 3553(b). There is no discussion in
the record of the meaning of the new § 3553(a) or of how subsections (a) and (b) might be harmonized.

118. See H.R. 6012, 98th Cong. (1984) (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 3523(b)(2) requiring the court to impose the "least severe appropriate measure" when sentencing). This bill's emphasis on advisory guidelines and preservation of
broad judicial discretion was consistent with most of the previous bills reported out of the House Judiciary Committee and debated in the House. See
Stith and Koh, supra, note 107, at 236 (describing the vast differences between the House and Senate bills stemming from the House's strong support
of greater judicial discretion in sentencing).
119. See H.R. REP. No. 98-1017, at 252-54 (1984) (dissenting views of Rep.
Gekas et al.) (unfavorably comparing the House bill with the Senate approach).
120. See 130 CONG. REC. 26,784-835 (1984) (amending H.R.J. Res. 648,
98th Cong. (1984) by adding the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984).
121. See 130 CONG. REC. 29,870 (1984) (proposing an amendment to the
joint resolution that included the "sufficient but not greater than necessary"
language).
122. Hutchinson and Yellen suggest that the House language was added
"as a gesture to the House Judiciary Committee." THOMAS W. HUTCHINSON &
DAVID YELLEN, FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE 427 (1989). This
explanation seems plausible, and if true, bolsters the view that the Senate did
not perceive this language as particularly substantive. At this stage, there
was no need for major policy concessions to obtain House support because the
original Senate bill had already been approved.
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Noting the Senate's eleventh-hour incorporation of the
parsimony language, Clarke and McFadden argue that
"Senator Mathias and the House won: the 'sufficient, but not
greater than necessary' language exists and should be acknowledged as a legitimate basis for departure." 123 We believe
this is a misreading of the statute and the legislative history.
First, this reading of the legislative history ignores the fact
that the bill adopted by Congress incorporated the approach
associated with the Senate's bills in every essential way. It
called for a full-time, presidentially-appointed Commission
empowered to make broad decisions regarding sentencing policy and to draft complex guidelines; it eliminated parole; it contained language strongly suggesting the illegitimacy of the use
of many offender characteristics traditionally relied upon by
judges; and, most important, it contained the specific directive
to sentencing judges in § 3553(b) to follow the Guidelines. It
was virtually identical to S. 1762, reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1983, the legislative history of which establishes the intent to rein in judicial discretion.
In the context of the SRA as a whole, it would be anomalous to read the parsimony language added in October 1984 as
an independent basis for departure. Such an interpretation
would, in effect, permit a sentencing judge to reject the Guidelines range established by the Commission merely because that
judge felt that the range was higher than necessary to serve
the purposes of sentencing. This would eviscerate the Com124
mission's role and the presumptive nature of the Guidelines.
Further, this reading of § 3553(a) would have represented too
great a shift in the Senate's approach to sentencing reform.
There is nothing in the legislative history to suggest that at the
last minute the Senate repudiated its consistently stated view
that presumptive guidelines were needed. Even Representative Conyers, a long-time foe of the Senate reform proposals
and advocate of unfettered judicial sentencing discretion, derided the last-minute Senate amendment as "purely cos-

123. Clarke & McFadden, supra note 14, at 931.
124. It is important to bear in mind that the Senate report cited the lack of
consensus among judges as to sentencing purposes as a major source of the
sentencing disparity the bill was designed to alleviate. See S. REP. No. 98225, at 41 n.18 & 41-46 (1983) (discussing empirical evidence suggesting
variation among federal judges about purpose of sentencing and impact of this
variation on sentence disparity).
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metic." 125 The record demonstrates that the result of the Senate and House conflict "was not compromise but clear and
complete victory for the Senate approach."'26
3. The 1987 Amendment and Accompanying Legislative
History
One footnote to the legislative history is that the debate
over the interaction of §§ 3553(a) and (b), which did not take
place before the SRA's passage, occurred in 1987 when Congress amended subsection (b). The Sentencing Act of 1987 contained several amendments to the SRA, designated as technical and clarifying, including a modest amendment to the
language of § 3553(b). The principal change in that section
was the insertion of the phrase "of a kind, or to a degree" after
the phrase "there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance."127 The House initially proposed the "of a kind, to a degree" language.1 28 This amendment to the SRA was fairly
straightforward and was designed, according to Senator Kennedy,
to make clear what is already implicit in current law, that a factor
can be found not to have been adequately considered either first, because it is not reflected in the applicable guidelines at all, or second,
because it is not2reflected
to the unusual extent that it is present in a
9
particular case.1

The House, however, included in the legislative record a
section-by-section analysis of the amendments that went far
125. John Conyers, Unresolved Issues in the Federal Sentencing Reform
Act, 32 FED. BAR NEWS &J. 68, 69 (1985).
126. Stith & Koh, supra note 107, at 236.
127. Thus, the new provision read:
The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range,
referred to within subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that there
exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a
degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission in formulating the Guidelines that should result in a
sentence different from that described.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994). To protect the Commissioners and their work
product from subpoena relating to the "adequately considered" issue, § 3553
also was amended to provide that in determining whether a circumstance was
adequately taken into consideration, the court shall consider only the Guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission. Id. § 3553(a).
128. 133 CONG. REC. H10,015 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1987) (statement of Rep.
Conyers).
129. 133 CONG. REC. S16,648 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1987) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy).
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beyond explaining the purpose of those amendments, and attempted to reinterpret the meaning of § 3553(a) and (b), suggesting that § 3553(a) could provide an independent basis for
departure.3 0 The Senate sponsors of the SRA immediately objected to this effort as unapproved, not voted upon, and not
agreed to; in effect, they considered it revisionist legislative
history. 3 ' The issue sparked such great controversy that the
Senate sponsors took the unusual step of issuing a bipartisan
joint explanation" repudiating the analysis placed in the record by the House staff, and setting out their views of the principles and purposes embodied in the SRA's departure provisions. 32
The joint explanation by Senators Biden, Thurmond, Kennedy, and Hatch makes clear that the Senate unanimously
passed S. 1822 on October 28, 1987, to make technical and
clarifying changes to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, but
133
allowed only days before the changes were to take effect.
The House Judiciary Committee, however, decided to oppose
expedited review until the Senate sponsors agreed to "drop or
limit the scope of several sections" and add clarifying language
to the standard for departures.134 In return, the Committee
agreed to support immediate passage of S. 1822.131 The joint
explanation further established that while the Senate sponsors
accepted the compromise, they neither reviewed nor approved
the section-by-section analysis of S. 1822, which the House
staff placed in the record. 136 The joint explanation expressed
disagreement with several parts of the House's analysis, including the analysis of § 3553(a) and (b):

130. 133 CONG. REC. 31,947-49 (statement by Rep. Conyers). The House's
analysis also involved efforts to construe several other provisions of the 1984
Act, id., which also prompted objections from the Senate sponsors. 133 CONG.
REC. S16,646 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1987) (joint explanation of S. 1822 by Senators Biden, Thurmond, Kennedy, and Hatch).
131.

133 CONG. REC. S16,646 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1987) (joint explanation of

S. 1822 by Senators Biden, Thurmond, Kennedy, and Hatch). Their joint
statement was characterized by the House's analysis as an "attempt to construe provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act that passed three years ago,"
which "carry no weight as legislative history." Id.
132. Id. at S16,646-47.

133. The Senate wanted the changes effective on November 1, 1987; therefore, it was important to get the bill passed as quickly as possible. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.

136. Id. at S16,646.
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The first assertion [made by the House in its section-by-section
analysis] is that 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(a) provides authority for sentencing courts to depart from the guidelines. The Senate sponsors
think it is clear that while many statutory provisions bear on the sentencing decision, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(b) exclusively governs the sentencing judge's authority to depart from the guidelines. An alternative view, such as that proposed by the House, would permit courts to
of guideline sentencing, a result Concircumvent the centralpurposes
7
gress clearly never intended.13

The use of the term "exclusively governs" leaves little
doubt that the Senate intended no substantive change in the
departure provision. The Senate rejected the House interpretation.
Moreover, according to Senator Hatch, the House assertion
that the language in § 3553(a) provided an alternative standard of departure was contrary to the legislative intent behind
the measure. On the floor of the Senate, Senator Hatch observed that § 3553(a) added nothing more than clarifying language to the extent that excessively lenient or excessively
harsh sentences were inappropriate.
In short, the phrase merely clarified the purposes of sentencing and
did not provide an additional basis for departure. Frankly, I would
not have agreed to this amendment offered in 1984, and I do not believe the managers of the bill or the Senate would have accepted this
amendment, had it been interpreted in the manner now being urged
by the House. The suggestion promoted by the House in this statement would be a radical change in the Sentencing Reform Act and
does not have the concurrence of the Senate.
In fact, it is section 3553(b), not section 3553(a), that provides the
basis for departure. Section 3 of S. 1822 amends section 3553(b) and
clarifies the standard for departure, but it does not broaden the departure standard in any way. Section 3 adds the words "of a kind or
to a degree" to the existing standard for departure. The standard for
departure is vital to the proper functioning of the guidelines system.
It tells judges when, under the law, they are permitted to impose a
sentence outside the guidelines promulgated by the Sentencing
Commission. If the standard is relaxed, there is a danger that trial
judges will be able to depart from the guidelines too freely, and such
unwarranted departures would undermine the core function of the
guidelines and the underlying statute, which is to reduce disparity in
sentencing and restore fairness and predictability to the sentencing
process. Adherence to the guidelines is therefore properly required
under the law except in those rare and particularly unusual instances
in which the court concludes that there is present in the case an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind or to a degree not in-

137.

133 CONG. REC. S16,646 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1987) (emphasis added).
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cluded in the guidelines, and that the presence of this 138
circumstance
should result in a sentence different from that described.

Senator Biden, a co-author and manager of the 1984 Comprehensive Crime Control bill, agreed with Senator Hatch's assessment of the relative effects of § 3553(a) and (b):
The House interpretation of this 1984 Senate amendment allegedly
would permit courts to circumvent a sentence called for by the guidelines based on the argument that some lesser sentence would be sufficient to meet the purposes of sentencing or, alternatively,
that a
139
greater sentence is necessary to meet those purposes.

The joint explanation is reminiscent of the earlier debate
in the Senate over the amendment to S. 1762 proposed by
Senator Mathias to make the Guidelines voluntary. 40 The
joint explanation also highlights the fundamental problem
with the view of § 3553(a) espoused by the 1987 House analysis
and by Clarke and McFadden: that interpretation would, in effect, render the Guidelines merely advisory because the sentencing judge would be able to depart whenever he or she felt
the sentence was too high or too low. 14 1 As explained above,
there is nothing in the contemporaneous legislative history to
suggest that the Senate intended this approach, and the 1987
legislative "history" reinforces that view.
The entire 1987 exchange between the House and the Senate regarding the meaning of the SRA's departure provisions of
1984 should be viewed with some caution as it is merely legislative history. This exchange nevertheless supports the view
that the Senate did not intend to work a major substantive
change in the implementation of the Guidelines when it incorporated the parsimony language of § 3553(a), and that language thus cannot be viewed as an independent basis for departure.
D.

CONCLUSION

While there has been considerable dispute over the proper
scope of departure in the Guidelines sentencing scheme, the
language, legislative history, structure, and purpose of the
SRA and the Guidelines establish that Congress did not design
departure provisions to be used whenever the sentencing judge
138. Id. (statement of Sen. Hatch).
139. Id. (statement of Sen. Biden).
140. See supra text accompanying note 114 (discussing the Committee's
rejection of the Mathias amendment).
141. See supra text accompanying note 138 (quoting Sen. Hatch's disapproval of relaxed standards in the Guidelines).

332

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:299

viewed the applicable Guidelines sentence as too harsh or too
lenient. Rather, Congress designed departures to provide some
flexibility to judges facing extraordinary or atypical cases.
This background informs the analyses of appellate departure
jurisprudence and district court departure practice undertaken
below.
II. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

A. DATA
The data for this study came from the Commission's case
monitoring database, a comprehensive computerized database
containing information on cases in which judges sentenced under the Guidelines. The principal source of information used
here is the individual case monitoring files, provided to the
Commission by the United States Probation Offices of the various United States district courts.
Each case monitoring file typically contains: (a) the Judgment of Conviction, which sets forth the defendant's sentence;
(b) the Statement of Reasons, which reflects the court's determination of the applicable Guidelines sentencing range, and an
indication of whether, and why, the court departed from that
range; (c) the Presentence Report (PSR), a document prepared
by the probation officer assigned to the individual case, which
contains information about pertinent offense and offender
characteristics;14 2 and (d) the probation officer's guideline calculation worksheets, which indicate how the probation officer calculated the recommended Guidelines sentencing range. The
written plea agreement is sometimes included in the case
monitoring files as well as the court's written explanation of
the departure or pertinent excerpts of the sentencing proceeding's transcript.
While the case monitoring data files contained a wealth of
valuable information, the data were not perfect. Several problems limited its utility. For example, the PSR occasionally did
not contain pertinent offender data, such as race or educational
142. The PSR contains a relatively detailed account of the offense behavior, derived from the investigative files and supplemented by written submissions and interviews with the prosecuting attorney and the defendant. The
PSR also contains fairly detailed biographical information about the defendant, including demographic characteristics, background and family ties, education and employment histories, and analyses of the defendantfs physical,
emotional, and financial conditions.
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background; some relevant documentation such as the plea
agreement or a sentencing transcript may not have been forwarded to the Commission; or the sentencing judge may have
inadequately documented the basis for departure in the Statement of Reasons. Where such missing data could be derived
from other sources, the absence of this data and its effect on
the analysis is noted in the jurisdictional analyses presented
below in Part IV. While we note this limitation, we emphasize
that missing data in the case monitoring files were uncommon.
In our judgment, the available data were sufficient to conduct
meaningful analyses of departure practices in the districts selected for our study.
B. PARAMETERS OF RESEARCH
Before examining the study's methodology, it is important
to understand the study's scope. First, this study excludes departures for substantial assistance under section 5K1.1 of the
United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual.'4 3 The principal
reason for this is that the study is primarily interested in departure as an exercise of judicial discretion. Substantial assistance departures, because they require a motion from the government, raise a host of other legal and policy issues beyond
the scope of the study. As the First Circuit has noted, section
5K2.0 departures for atypical aggravating or mitigating circumstances are totally different from section 5K1.1 departures. '4
Moreover, because of the extensive prosecutorial involvement in substantial assistance departures, the type of study
necessary to explore such departures differs substantially from
the methods we sought to employ here. A substantial assistance departure study requires intensive interviews of judges,
defense counsel, and particularly, prosecutors, a procedure at
odds with the broad overview of departure practices we sought
to complete here.

143. That section provides, 'Upon motion of the government stating that
the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or
prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the court may
depart from the guidelines." U.S.S.G. (1994), supra note 46, § 5K1.1.
144. See United States v. Mariano, 983 F.2d 1150, 1154-55 (1st Cir. 1993)
(explaining that section 5K1.1 is a distinct provision with a "different raison
d'etre" from section 5K2.0 and that the "methodological contrast between the
two departure modalities is glaring").
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Finally, at the time of the research, there was a separate
working group within the Commission formed to study substantial assistance departure practices. Because the working
group wished to examine the major components of substantial
assistance policies, practices, and outcomes in the federal system, the group collected data from a variety of sources: caselaw
review, United States attorney surveys, site visits, individual
case studies, co-defendant conspiracy studies, and aggregate
statistical analysis.
The Substantial Assistance Working
Group has analyzed the information collected and plans on releasing a report of their findings in the spring of 1997.
The study's research is also limited to cases in which the
court specifically stated that it was departing from the Guidelines range, or when such a departure was readily apparent
from the statement of reasons filed by the court.145 There have
been cases in which fact-bargaining, charge-bargaining,
Guidelines-factor-bargaining, calculation error, or some other
factor resulted in a sentence different from that prescribed by
the Guidelines. Such cases, however, are not formal, overt departures under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(b), and, therefore are not
146
within this study's scope.
Finally, the study did not attempt to identify cases in
which there may have been grounds for departure, but the
court declined to depart. While this type of analysis would
surely be interesting, we deemed it not practicable for the
study's purposes because it would require a missing data collection effort.

145. A departure might be readily apparent, for example, when the court's
statement of reasons specifies a particular total offense level, criminal history
score, and resulting Guidelines range, yet imposes a sentence below that
range. Unless there is a reference to a substantial assistance motion in the
statement of reasons, the presentence report, or the plea agreement, such a
case would be coded as a departure, with no reason for departure provided.
Such cases are rare. In the vast majority of cases, the statement of reasons
specifies that the court has departed and provides a reason for departure.
146. Some aspects of these "covert departures" were the focus of earlier research. See, e.g., Ilene H. Nagel and Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three
Cities: An Empirical Study of Chargingand BargainingPractices Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 501 (1992) (discussing
problems of, and suggested solutions to, prosecutorial charging and bargaining power); Stephen J. Schulhofer and flene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under
the FederalSentencing Guidelines: The FirstFifteen Months, 27 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 231 (1989) (reviewing the impact of the Guidelines on plea negotiations).
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C. SAMPLING AND METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURES

The study's analysis was two-pronged. First, it analyzed
relevant appellate jurisprudence at the time the research was
conducted from six selected courts of appeal 14 These circuits
were selected on a non-random basis in order to maximize geographic and demographic diversity among the districts selected
for inclusion in the study. We analyzed the departure caselaw
in each circuit to identify specific similarities and differences in
the appellate departure jurisprudence, and to compare and
contrast the general approaches to departure exhibited by the
various courts of appeals. The principal purpose of the jurisprudential analysis was to provide a background contextual
picture to facilitate analysis of sentencing practices within
each of the districts we studied.
The second prong of our analysis was a review of departure
practices at the district court level. This analysis was qualitative in nature and was intended to supplement the extensive
aggregate statistical data on departures already compiled by
the Commission. The study selected, in a non-random fashion,
five districts from each of the six circuits-thirty districts in
all. As before, we selected the districts to maximize geographic
and demographic diversity. For each district, the study reviewed the case monitoring file for every non-section 5K1.1 departure in fiscal years 1991 and 1992. For those districts with
an extremely large number of departures, we reviewed a sample of one hundred departures drawn from the relevant time
period. In all, we analyzed case file data for approximately
1,400 departures drawn from the thirty judicial districts.
Based on our detailed review of the case files, we coded
each case with the reason and extent of departure, the type of
offense, the individual trial court judge and date of appointment to the bench, the race, gender, and socioeconomic status
of the offender, and whether the conviction resulted from a
trial or guilty plea. We also recorded comments made by the
judge which might reveal the judge's attitude toward departures or the Guidelines in general. We analyzed the data to determine whether any important patterns or variations across
districts or circuits emerged.

147. These were the First, Second, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits.
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE APPELLATE DEPARTURE
JURISPRUDENCE

A. INTRODUCTION
Our study's principal focus was the departure activity of
sentencing judges at the district court level. The appellate
caselaw of each circuit, however, informs and influences district court judges in their sentencing decisions. In this section,
we undertake a brief analysis of the departure jurisprudence of
the six circuits from which our departure cases have been selected. The similarities and differences among the circuits that
emerge from this analysis will inform the analysis of district
court departure practice that we report below.
B. CIRCUIT COURT ANALYSIS
1. Standards of Review
During fiscal years 1991 and 1992, the three-part test announced in United States v. Diaz-Villafane,'48 governed appellate review of departure decisions in each of the six circuits
from which our departure cases were drawn.1 49 The First Circuit summarized the test as follows:
First, we consider whether the circumstances relied on by the sentencing court warranted a departure ....
Second, we determine
whether the circumstances relied on by the sentencing court are present in appellant's case; findings of fact are reviewed for clear error....
Third, we evaluate the reasonableness of the direction and degree of
the challenged departure. The reasonableness determination is "quintessentially a judgment call," primarily entrusted to the district
50
court.1

The first step of the Diaz-Villafane standard is the critical
barrier to affirmance of the departure; the appellate court re148. 874 F.2d 43,49 (1st Cir. 1989).
149. Although many cases do not explicitly cite it as direct authority, the
majority of cases follow an analysis utilizing the test announced in DiazVillafane. See, e.g., United States v. Feekes, 929 F.2d 334, 338 (7th Cir.
1991); United States v. Lira-Barraza, 941 F.2d 745, 746-47 (9th Cir. 1991) (en
banc); United States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599, 602-03 (2d Cir. 1990); United
States v. Lang, 898 F.2d 1378, 1379-81 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Shuman, 902 F.2d 873, 875-76 (11th Cir. 1990).
It should be noted that in Koon v. United States the Supreme Court held
that a unitary abuse of discretion standard was the appropriate standard of
review for district court departure decisions. 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2047-48 (1996).
150. United States v. Polanco-Reynoso, 924 F.2d 23, 24 (1st Cir. 1990)
(citations omitted).
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views de novo whether the district court's grounds for departure are permissible. Under the First Circuit's approach, however, the district court enjoys considerable deference through
the remainder of the test. This is particularly true during step
three, the reasonableness determination. The higher level of
deference is necessary because "appellate review must occur
with full awareness of, and respect for, the [district court's] superior 'feel' for the case. [The appellate court] will not lightly
disturb decisions ... implicating degrees of departure."15 1 In
short, under Diaz-Villafane and its progeny, review of the decision to depart is rigorous, but the extent of departure
is al52
most entirely left to the discretion of the district court.1
Although each appellate court applied the same formal
standard of review, there were some notable differences in emphasis. For example, the Seventh Circuit's departure review
tended to be somewhat more aggressive than that of the other
courts. In making the reasonableness determination, the degree of deference was tempered by the requirement that the
degree of departure "must be linked to the structure of the
Guidelines." 153 The Seventh Circuit appeared to be more willing than most to reverse departures, both upward and downward, based on its assessment of the reasonableness of the degree of departure. In United States v. Schmude, for example,
the court reversed a departure effectively doubling the Guide54
lines range based on the "repeat nature" of the offense.1
Similarly, in United States v. Boula, the court concluded that a
ten-level departure
based on the number of fraud victims was
55
not reasonable.1

151. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d at 49-50; see also United States v. Ocasio,
914 F.2d 330, 336 (1st Cir. 1990) (indicating that although some courts have
suggested formulaic approaches to assessing the reasonableness of departures, the First Circuit views this method with some skepticism).
152. See United States v. Perkins, 929 F.2d 436, 438 (8th Cir. 1991)
(agreeing that a district court's departure from the Guidelines must be given
deference because of the district court's "superior 'feel' "); United States v.
Snover, 900 F.2d 1207, 1209 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that upward departure
from 14 to 21-month range to 46 months was "reasonable" in light of sentencing judge's "feel" for the case and opportunity to judge defendants' credibility);
United States v. Correa-Vargas, 860 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1988) (affirming as
not "unreasonable" departure from range of 6 to 12 months to statutory
maximum of 48 months).
153. United States v. Gaddy, 909 F.2d 196, 199 (7th Cir. 1990).
154. United States v. Schmude, 901 F.2d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1990).
155. United States v. Boula, 932 F.2d 651, 657 (7th Cir. 1991).
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The Ninth Circuit was also notable in its departure review
standards, as the court imposed rather stringent procedural
requirements on district courts' decisions to depart. The Ninth
Circuit required district courts to state the reasons for depar57
ture on the record 5 6 and to explain the extent of departure.
The Ninth Circuit strictly applied these requirements and vacated numerous departures, especially upward departures, for
court's failure to provide an adequate explanathe sentencing
58
tion.'
Four circuits imposed a structuring requirement on their
district courts for some departures based on criminal history.
Under this approach, the sentencing judge sequentially examined each criminal history category and explained the appropriateness59 of the category selected, as well as the extent of departure. 1

156. See United States v. Hoyungowa, 930 F.2d 744, 748 n.1 (9th Cir. 1991)
(holding the appellate court could not affirm the decision of the sentencing
court merely because some unusual, but uncited, circumstances could have
warranted the upward departure, and requiring the sentencing court to adequately articulate its grounds for the upward departure). In addition, the
Ninth Circuit has held that a sentencing departure based on a defendant's
criminal history which does not adequately describe the criminal history, and
is conclusory in nature, is not sufficient to sustain a departure from the
Guidelines. United States v. Wells, 878 F.2d 1232, 1233 (9th Cir. 1989); see
also United States v. Michel, 876 F.2d 784, 786 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that
the district court's failure to clearly identify the specific aggravating circumstances invalidated its departure from the Guidelines). The purpose of this
requirement is to enable the appellate court to engage in a meaningful review
of the reasonableness of the departure. Wells, 878 F.2d at 1233.
157. See United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 975 F.2d 622, 628 (9th
Cir. 1992) (reversing a departure from 4 to 10-month range to 30 months because the court "neither explained the amount of its departure nor analogized
to other portions of the Guidelines"); see also United States v. Streit, 962 F.2d
894, 903 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that the appellate court considers only "the
reasons actually articulated by the district court both for the departure and
for the extent of the departure") (emphasis added).
158. The Seventh Circuit was also fairly strict in requiring that the sentencing court explicitly state, with adequate justification, its reasons for both
the decision to depart and the extent of departure. For example, in United
States v. Gentry, the court reversed a substantial downward departure that
had been based on the offender's mental condition. 925 F.2d 186, 189 (7th Cir.
1990). The Gentry court vacated the sentence departure, reasoning that the
district court did not provide an adequate explanation for the extent of the
departure. Id.
159. See Gentry, 925 F.2d at 189 (requiring a district court that reduced a
sentence by 50% to explicitly justify the reasons behind the departure);
United States v. Shuman, 902 F.2d 873, 876 (11th Cir. 1990) (noting that the
district court's specific findings that a defendant voluntarily brought her son
into a drug business environment, in addition to her previous criminal his-
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2. Upward Departures
Analysis of the upward departure caselaw of the six selected circuits revealed broad similarities in their approaches.
These courts tended to be fairly sympathetic to upward departures, especially where the sentencing judge identified offense
conduct that was unusually serious in some respect.1 60
The six circuits did diverge somewhat in their treatment of
upward departures based on criminal history, however. 161 The
tory, provided sufficient documentation to justify departure from the Guidelines); United States v. Cervantes, 878 F.2d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding the
district court's mere statement that the defendant had a "'pretty bad record'"
rendered the departure improper due to a lack of specific findings with respect to the defendant's criminal history); United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d
466, 470 (7th Cir. 1989) (observing that a departure from the Guidelines
should set forth a specific explanation referring to the criminal history categories and their intended applicability).
160. See United States v. Ellis, 935 F.2d 385, 396 (1st Cir. 1991) (affirming
upward departure based on extreme psychological harm to a child subjected to
extensive sexual abuse); United States v. Reyes, 927 F.2d 48, 51-52 (1st Cir.
1991) (approving an upward departure based upon the reckless endangerment
of the lives of smuggled aliens); United States v. Hernandez, 941 F.2d 133,
141 (2d Cir. 1991) (upholding a district court's upward departure for a defendant who used a weapon during drug trafficking); United States v. Pergola,
930 F.2d 216, 219 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that defendant's harassing communications to his girlfriend that resulted in severe emotional and behavioral
impairment warranted departure); United States v. Feekes, 929 F.2d 334, 337
(7th Cir. 1991) (observing that upward departure was appropriate because the
defendant distributed heroine in prison); United States v. Morin, 935 F.2d
143, 145 (8th Cir. 1991) (finding that the extraordinarily young age of a sexual
assault victim and the resulting serious psychological harm justified upward
departure); United States v. Perkins, 929 F.2d 436, 438 (8th Cir. 1991) (validating the district court's upward departure because of the unusual financial
and psychological injury caused by the defendant's credit card fraud); United
States v. Loveday, 922 F.2d 1411, 1417-18 (9th Cir. 1991) (endorsing the district court's upward departure since the defendant's manufacturing and storage of pipe bombs in a home constituted a public danger); United States v.
Perez-Magana, 929 F.2d 518, 520-21 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that reckless
driving that endangers public safety and subjects passengers to "dangerous
treatment" can be sufficient to justify upward departure); United States v.
Sweeting, 933 F.2d 962, 966-67 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting that defendant's
membership in a gang that engaged in drive-by shootings and his possession
of dangerous firearms for use in drug trafficking sufficiently justified the district court's upward departure); United States v. Correas-Vargas, 860 F.2d 35,
38 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding that the district court appropriately considered the
large amount of cocaine possessed by the defendant in granting upward departure).
161. The Guidelines specifically provide, "Ifreliable information indicates
that the criminal history category does not adequately reflect the seriousness
of the defendant's past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the defendant
will commit other crimes, the court may consider imposing a sentence depart-
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Eighth Circuit, for example, invited such departures by approving them on a wide variety of grounds, including: convictions too old'62 or too minor'63 to be included in calculating the
offender's criminal history category (CHC); unduly lenient past
sentences;" evidence of prior similar adult conduct not resulting in a criminal conviction;1 65 similarity of the current offense
conduct to prior offense conduct;' 66 commission of the offense
while on probation or pending trial in another case;' 67 and postarrest conduct suggesting likelihood of recidivism.'68 The Eleventh Circuit69was similarly hospitable to CHC-based upward
departures.

ing from the otherwise applicable guideline range." U.S.S.G. (1994), supra
note 46, § 4A1.3.
162. United States v. Davila, 964 F.2d 778, 785 (8th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Carey, 898 F.2d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 1990).
163. United States v. Morse, 983 F.2d 851, 854 (8th Cir. 1993).
164. United States v. Saunders, 957 F.2d 1488, 1493 (8th Cir. 1992).
165. United States v. Fawbush, 946 F.2d 584, 587 (8th Cir. 1991); see also
United States v. Sweet, 985 F.2d 443, 446 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting prior arrests
that did not result in conviction, as well as deferred prosecutions for similar
misconduct, justified upward departure).
166. United States v. Estrada, 965 F.2d 651, 653-54 (8th Cir. 1992); Davila, 964 F.2d at 785; see also United States v. Lloyd, 958 F.2d 804, 805 (8th
Cir. 1992) (indicating that the similarity between previous offenses and the
current conviction justified upward departure because of the seriousness of
defendant's conduct and the likelihood of recidivism); United States v. Gassler, 943 F.2d 909, 911 (8th Cir. 1991) (upholding an upward departure because defendant's previous convictions also involved the use or possession of a
firearm).
The major rationale for those departures appears to be the similarity of
conduct to previous offenses, suggesting that the previous sentences did not
sufficiently deter the offender. See, e.g., Carey, 898 F.2d at 646 (permitting
upward departure because the defendant's prior criminal history and his incorrigibility were not adequately reflected by his criminal history score).
167. Saunders,957 F.2d at 1492.
168. See Sweet, 985 F.2d at 446 (finding that defendant's threats to attack
court personnel or the judge with the weapon she obtained during the course
of her incarceration constituted an important factor in departing from the
Guidelines).
169. See, e.g., United States v. Ponder, 963 F.2d 1506, 1509-10 (11th Cir.
1992) (taking defendant's behavior while incarcerated for a previous offense
into account for sentencing the current offense); United States v. Riggs, 967
F.2d 561, 563-64 (11th Cir. 1992) (affirming upward departure based on unusual likelihood of recidivism); United States v. Briggman, 931 F.2d 705, 710
(11th Cir. 1991) (affirming departure beyond Category VI because of defendant's excess criminal history points); United States v. Suarez, 939 F.2d 929,
934 (11th Cir. 1991) (endorsing upward departure because the consolidation of
defendant's CHC did not adequately reflect the seriousness of his criminal
history); United States v. Campbell, 888 F.2d 76, 78-79 (11th Cir. 1989) (allowing an upward departure that essentially treated the defendant as a career
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The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits were deferential to sentencing courts in that they imposed no specific structuring requirement. This is in sharp contrast to the Ninth Circuit, for
example, which vacated numerous CHC-based upward departures on the ground that the district court failed to provide an
170
adequate explanation by way of analogy to higher categories.
The Second Circuit also reviewed upward departures relatively
aggressively, expressly discouraging upward departures beyond Category VI. 7 ' The Ninth Circuit's upward departure
jurisprudence was also notable in that the court rejected upward departures based both on facts that were rejected by a
jury's acquittal' and on charges dismissed pursuant to a plea
agreement. 171
criminal, despite the fact that defendant did not have the requisite two felony
convictions, because he was a "habitual criminal" with a high likelihood of recidivism). The Eleventh Circuit often permitted substantial departures from
the Guidelines. Specifically, in both Briggman, 931 F.2d at 708-10, and
Campbell, 888 F.2d at 79, the court affirmed sentences nearly double those
prescribed by the Guidelines.
170. See United States v. Rodriguez-Castro, 908 F.2d 438, 442-43 (9th Cir.
1990) (finding that the district court was "obligated to justify the extent of its
departure by analogy to the guideline sentences of defendants in a higher
criminal category"); see also United States v. Gayou, 901 F.2d 746, 750 n.4
(9th Cir. 1990) (vacating an upward departure and stating that, "the district
court can [not] simply throw the Guidelines to the wind once it decides to depart, and we intend to make it clear that the district court cannot do so");
United States v. Cervantes Lucatero, 889 F.2d 916, 917-19 (9th Cir. 1989)
(vacating an upward departure from 12 to 24 months because the district
court did not provide sufficiently specific reasons for the departure).
171. See United States v. Cervantes, 878 F.2d 50, 55 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding
that upward departures are appropriate in "only the most compelling circumstances").
172. In United States v. Brady, the court declined to follow other circuits
on this issue and held that a sentencing court may not depart upward based
on a factor that was necessarily rejected by the jury. 928 F.2d 844, 851 (9th
Cir. 1991), overruledon other grounds by Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct.
1921, 1928 (1994). As the court explained:
We would pervert our system of justice if we allowed a defendant to
suffer punishment for a criminal charge for which he or she was acquitted. The Guidelines recognize that voluntary manslaughter is to
be punished less severely than murder by setting a lower base offense
level for voluntary manslaughter than for murder. A sentencing
court should not be allowed to circumvent this statutory directive by
making a finding of fact-under any standard of proof-that the jury
necessarily rejected by its judgment of acquittal.
Id.
173. See United States v. Castro-Cervantes, 927 F.2d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir.
1991) (vacating a departure from a range of 30 to 37 months to 60 months
which was based on robbery charges dismissed by plea agreement). The court
held that under section 6B1.2(a) of the Guidelines, "the sentencing court
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3. Downward Departures
The extensive downward departure jurisprudence of the
six circuits in our study varied sufficiently to warrant a brief
discussion on each circuit's approach. A consistent rejection of
departures based on individual offender characteristics characterized the First Circuit's downward departure jurisprudence
in 1991 and 1992. Reversals of downward departures based on
the defendant's pregnancy, 4 family responsibility and impact
of the defendant's incarceration on children,' the defendant's
alcohol and drug dependency, 176 the defendant's employment
record, 1 7 and the defendant's passivity in committing the
crime and desire for rehabilitation 71 8 are illustrative. The First
Circuit also has rejected as a departure basis the defendant's

should reject a plea bargain that does not reflect the seriousness of the defendant's behavior and should not accept a plea bargain and then later count
dismissed charges in calculating the defendant's sentence." Id; see also
United States v. Faulkner, 952 F.2d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 1991) (vacating an
upward departure from a range of 63 to 78 months to 144 months based on
robbery charges dismissed by a plea agreement, noting that the court's use in
sentencing of charges dropped pursuant to the plea agreement was "patently
unfair" and would "undermine the integrity of the plea bargaining system" by
"severely undermin[ing] the incentive of defendants to enter into plea bargains").
174. See United States v. Pozzy, 902 F.2d 133, 138-39 (1st Cir.) ("The
pregnancy of convicted female felons is neither atypical nor unusual."), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
175. See United States v. Chestna, 962 F.2d 103, 107 (1st Cir.) (per curiam) (rejecting a downward departure for a single mother of three young
children), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 920 (1992); United States v. Carr, 932 F.2d
67, 72 (1st Cir.) (rejecting a downward departure for a mother with a fouryear-old son), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 834 (1991).
176. See United States v. Rushby, 936 F.2d 41, 43 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding
that a history of drug and alcohol abuse coupled with recent sobriety does not
justify a downward departure); United States v. Citro, 938 F.2d 1431, 1440
(1st Cir. 1991) (rejecting a downward departure based on the offender's drug
dependency), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1044 (1992).
177. See Rushby, 936 F.2d at 43 (holding that the defendant's steady and
successful employment in his own business did not justify a downward departure).
178. See United States v. Deane, 914 F.2d 11, 14 (1st Cir. 1990) (reversing
a downward departure in a child pornography case that had been based on the
passive nature of the defendant's conduct and his "otherwise exemplary life");
United States v. Studley, 907 F.2d 254, 257-59 (1st Cir. 1990) (rejecting a
downward departure in a child pornography case that had been based on the
fact that the defendant was a 'useful person," the defendant's "posture of rehabilitation," and the lack of an appropriate treatment program in prison).
Together, Deane and Studley indicate that the First Circuit strongly discourages downward departures in child pornography cases.
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post-offense efforts at rehabilitation." 9 As these cases demonstrate, the court adhered fairly rigidly to the goal of uniformity
in guideline application, particularly when considering what
factors place an offender outside the "heartland" of typical
cases.
In striking contrast, the Second Circuit often affirmed departures based on the offender's individual characteristics.
Examples included the defendant's family ties and circumstances, 180 employment history,' and physical characteristics
as they related to likelihood of abuse in prison. 8 2 Also notable
83 which
from the Second Circuit was United States v. Garcia,'
affirmed a downward departure based on the defendant's cooperation with the government. 184 The defendant's actions re179. See United States v. Sklar, 920 F.2d 107, 115-16 (1st Cir. 1990)
(quoting Studley, 907 F.2d at 259) (rejecting a downward departure for presentence rehabilitation that is not "so extraordinary as to suggest it's present
to a degree not adequately taken into consideration by the acceptance of responsibility reduction"). Some have criticized the court for this decision. See,
e.g., Aaron Rappaport, Guideline Developments in the First Circuit: The Two
Faces of Appellate Review, 5 FED. SENT. REP. 267, 268 (1993) (quoting an attorney characterizing Sklar as "the worst case yet under the guidelines").
180. See United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124, 128-30 (2d Cir. 1992)
(affirming a downward departure for a defendant who was the sole custodial
parent of three minor children, including one who was disabled); United
States v. Alba, 933 F.2d 1117, 1122 (2d Cir. 1991) (affirming a downward departure on the basis of the defendant's responsibility for the care of two minor
children and disabled parents, as well as the defendant's employment history); see also United States v. Sharpsteen, 913 F.2d 59, 63-64 (2d Cir. 1990)
(remanding for determination of whether the defendant's family circumstances were sufficiently extraordinary to warrant departure).
181. See United States v. Jagmohan, 909 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1990) (affirming a downward departure in a bribery case, based in part on the defendant's
stable employment history). The court in Jagmohan acknowledged that employment history is not ordinarily relevant to the decision to depart, but concluded that the district court's determination that this case was extraordinary
deserved great deference. "We do not view this appeal as presenting an instance in which we should reject the assessment of an experienced district
judge that the case presents exceptional circumstances." Id.
182. See United States v. Gonzalez, 945 F.2d 525, 526 (2d Cir. 1991) (affirming a downward departure on the basis of defendant's extreme vulnerability to physical assault); United States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599, 603 (2d Cir. 1990)
(upholding a downward departure based on the defendant's "vulnerability due
to his immature appearance, sexual orientation, and fragility"). The Lara
court expressed a very expansive view of the sentencing judge's departure
authority, explaining that "it was not Congress' aim to straightjacket a sentencing court, compelling it to impose sentences like a robot inside a Guidelines' glass bubble." Id. at 604.
183. 926 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1991).
184. Id. at 128.
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sulted in prompt disposition of related cases.'85 Garcia is unusual because it permits docket control considerations to affect
sentencing disposition, a basis for downward departure that
other circuits do not typically employ.
The Seventh Circuit consistently rejected downward departures, particularly those based on offender characteristics.
The court's approach to offender-based downward departures
is best exemplified by its decision in United States v. Thomas,186 in which the court rejected as a basis for departure the
defendant's status as sole caretaker of three children, one of
whom was mentally disabled. 8 7 The court read section 5H1.6
of the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual as prohibiting departure based on family circumstances where probation
is not a sentencing option, even in extraordinary cases. 188 The
restrictive view of departure articulated in Thomas was representative of the tone of Seventh Circuit caselaw; the court denied downward departures based on such factors as the defendant's mental condition, 1 89 age, 9 ° physical condition, 191 and
conclusions that an offense constituted a single act of aberrant
behavior. 92 It also rejected downward departures based on
culpability considerations such as the low purity
of the defen94
dant's illicit drugs 93 and victim misconduct.
185. Id.
186. 930 F.2d 526 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 857 (1991), partially superseded by regulationas stated in United States v. Canoy, 38 F.3d 893, 90507 (7th Cir. 1994).
187. Id. at 526. Subsequently, the Seventh Circuit noted that a recent
amendment to section 5H1.6 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual affected one basis of its decision in Thomas. Therefore, the court corrected
Thomas by holding in Canoy that "a district court may depart from an applicable guidelines range once it finds that a defendant's family ties and responsibilities or community ties are so unusual that they may be characterized as
extraordinary." Canoy, 38 F.3d at 905-07.
188. Thomas, 930 F.2d at 530.
189. See United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 593 (7th Cir.) (holding that a
downward departure is not justified for a defendant with a reduced mental
capacity and a history of violent crime), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 827 (1991).
190. See United States v. Carey, 895 F.2d 318, 324 (7th Cir. 1990)
(declaring improper a downward departure for a 62-year-old defendant absent
additional findings).
191. Id. at 324.
192. Id. at 325 (holding that a first time offense which involved extensive
planning over a 15-month period did not justify downward departure for a
single act of aberrant behavior).
193. See United States v. Upthegrove, 974 F.2d 55, 56 (7th Cir. 1992)
(holding that a downward departure was not justified for possessing, with the
intent to distribute, only low-grade "filler" marijuana).
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The Eighth Circuit demonstrated a relatively balanced approach to review of downward departures. The court typically
affirmed downward departures based on offense seriousness or
offender culpability.195 In contrast, the court's record in evaluating downward departures that were based on individual offender characteristics was mixed, although the court rejected
such factors in most cases. For example, the court generally
rejected family and community ties as insufficiently atypical to
warrant departure.'9 6 The court also rejected factors such as
the offender's cultural background,197 first offender status,1 98
194. See United States v. Bigelow, 914 F.2d 966, 975 (7th Cir. 1990)
(holding that refusing to pay debts, possessing an unpleasant voice and demeanor, and physically blocking the doorway of the defendant's home are not
victim misconduct justifying a downward departure), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1121 (1991).
195. See, e.g., United States v. Crumb, 902 F.2d 1337, 1340 (8th Cir. 1990)
(affirming a downward departure in a failure to surrender for service of sentence case where the defendant surrendered voluntarily after a short delay);
United States v. Yellow Earrings, 891 F.2d 650, 654 (8th Cir. 1989) (affirming
a downward departure in an assault case based on victim misconduct which
"substantially contributed to provoking the offense behavior"). But see United
States v. Desormeaux, 952 F.2d 182, 185 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that the defendant's physical and psychological abuse was "too attenuated" to warrant
departure); United States v. Shortt, 919 F.2d 1325, 1328 (8th Cir. 1990)
(reversing a downward departure for an offender who manufactured a pipe
bomb to blow up his spouse's lover, noting that "It]hough certainly wrongful
and provocative, adultery does not justify blowing up the adulterers, or
building a bomb capable of doing so").
The court also upheld a downward departure when the negligence of government officials was partly responsible for the offense. See United States v.
Whitehorse, 909 F.2d 316, 319 (8th Cir. 1990) (affirming a downward departure in a case involving an "escape" from a federal institution, where prison
officials were responsible for the failure to properly supervise the offender's
prison furlough).
196. In United States v. Neil, 903 F.2d 564, 565 (8th Cir. 1990), the court
held that the defendant's supportive family relationships and his community
ties (specifically the fact that he coached young athletes in his community)
were not sufficiently unusual to constitute mitigating circumstances not adequately considered in the Guidelines. See also United States v. Sutherland,
890 F.2d 1042, 1043 (8th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (affirming the district court's
refusal to depart downward for family and community ties).
Similarly, in Shortt, the court vacated a family circumstances departure
based on the defendant's wife's history of drug and alcohol abuse and on his
father's disability. In its conclusion, the appellate court noted the wife's testimony at trial that she had overcome her problems and that the defendant
had two brothers who were capable of assisting the father. 919 F.2d at 1328.
197. In United States v. Natal-Rivera, 879 F.2d 391, 393 (8th Cir. 1989),
the court rejected the defendant's claim that a downward departure was justified because her cultural background socialized her to follow her husband's
commands to engage in illegal conduct.
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military record,199 status as a bi-racial adopted child, 200 and
post-offense rehabilitation. 0 ' In United States v. Big Crow, °2
however, the court upheld a substantial downward departure
in an assault case, based on the defendant's employment record and community ties. 0 3 While acknowledging that employment and community ties are not ordinarily relevant in sentencing, the court emphasized that the defendant's ability to
maintain employment despite the extreme adversity of the social and economic environment on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation made the defendant's case extraordinary enough to
warrant departure. 20 4 The Eighth Circuit also agreed with the
Second Circuit in permitting a departure based on the of-

198. See, e.g., Neil, 903 F.2d at 566 (finding that the criminal history score
adequately accounted for first offender status).
199. In Neil, the court rejected as a basis for a downward departure the
defendant's 11 years of military duty within the continental United States,
explaining that such a career "is not meaningfully distinguishable from the
work history of steadily employed individuals holding responsible positions in
the civilian work force." Id. The court left open the possibility, however, that
a downward departure may be possible for a defendant with a particular exemplary military record, one who has "displayed the attributes of courage,
loyalty, and personal sacrifice that others in society have not." Id.
200. The court rejected this as a basis for departure in United States v.
Prestemon, 929 F.2d 1275, 1277-78 (8th Cir.) ("We do not think an offender's
status as an adopted child is so unusual or atypical that the Sentencing
Commission did not adequately take such circumstances into consideration in
formulating the guidelines."), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 877 (1991).
201. In United States v. Desormeaux, the court rejected the defendant's
post-arrest rehabilitation efforts (specifically, attainment of her GED) and her
potential contribution to society as bases for departure. 952 F.2d 182, 185-87
(8th Cir. 1991). The Desormeaux court adopted the analysis of the Fourth and
Seventh Circuits, holding that post-offense rehabilitation is equivalent to acceptance of responsibility under section 3E1.1 of the Guidelines, and is not a
basis for departure. Id. at 185-86 (citing United States v. Bruder, 945 F.2d
167, 173 (7th Cir. 1991) (en banc) and United States v. Van Dyke, 895 F.2d
984, 987 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 838 (1990)).
202. 898 F.2d 1326 (8th Cir. 1990).
203. Id. at 1332.
204. Id. ("Big Crow's excellent employment history, solid community ties,
and consistent efforts to lead a decent life in a difficult environment are sufficiently unusual to constitute grounds for... departure .... "). The court emphasized the reservation's 72% unemployment rate and average annual income of $1,042 in support of its conclusion that this was an unusual case. Id.
at 1331. Although the court acknowledged that consideration of these factors
was tantamount to departure on the basis of national origin and socioeconomic status, factors inappropriate under section 5H1.10 of the Guidelines, it
ignored those limitations, implying (but not holding) that section 5H1.10 is inconsistent with the SRA's legislative history. Id. at 1332 n.3.
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fender's extraordinary physical impairment and consequent
vulnerability to attack in prison." 5
The Ninth Circuit exhibited a mixed response to departures based on individual offender characteristics. Generally,
the court rejected as bases for departure such individual offender characteristics as the defendant's substance abuse, 0 6
drug rehabilitation, 20 7 age,20 need for psychiatric help, 20 9 family
circumstances, 210 and employment history. 211 In contrast, however, this circuit was responsible for several interesting and
controversial cases permitting downward departure based on
offender characteristics such as lack of youthful guidance,212
prior benevolent acts,213 and a history of childhood abuse.214
205. United States v. Long, 977 F.2d 1264, 1277 (8th Cir. 1992).
206. See United States v. Martin, 938 F.2d 162, 163 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting drug dependence as a basis for departure), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 988
(1992); United States v. Page, 922 F.2d 534, 535 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding the
defendanfts extreme alcoholism was not an appropriate departure factor);
United States v. Sanchez, 933 F.2d 742, 746-47 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that
the defendant's addiction to legal prescription drugs was not a basis for departure).
207. See Martin, 938 F.2d at 163 (holding defendant's post-arrest drug rehabilitation efforts do not constitute a valid basis for departure because the
Commission's policy statement accompanying section 5H1.4 of the Guidelines
indicates that the Commission adequately addressed this factor in formulating the Guidelines); see also United States v. Anders, 956 F.2d 907, 911 (9th
Cir. 1992) (rejecting downward departure based on drug rehabilitation efforts), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 989 (1993).
208. InAnders, 956 F.2d at 912, the court rejected as clearly erroneous the
district court's finding that the defendant's age (46) was extraordinary because it represented a "critical time in [the defendant's] life."
209. See United States v. Deering, 909 F.2d 392, 395 (9th Cir. 1990)
(stating that 'the need for psychiatric treatment is not a circumstance which
justifies departure").
210. See United States v. Berlier, 948 F.2d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 1991)
(vacating departure from 15 months to probation in embezzlement case and
quoting United States v. Daly, 883 F.2d 313, 319 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
496 U.S. 927 (1990), in noting that imposition of a prison sentence " !normally
disrupts spousal and parental relationships,'" and that this is an insufficient
reason for departure).
211. See Anders, 956 F.2d at 913 (finding no extraordinary or unusual aspect in an employment record when the defendant held a steady job until his
drug use made it impossible to continue working).
212. See United States v. Floyd, 945 F.2d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 1991)
(upholding a departure from a range of 360 months to life to 204 months because of the defendant's "[1]ack of guidance and education, abandonment by
parents, and imprisonment at age 17"), overruled by United States v. Atkinson, 990 F.2d 501, 503 (9th Cir. 1993).
213. In United States v. Takai, 941 F.2d 738, 744 (9th Cir. 1991), the court
stated:
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The court was also more willing than other appellate courts to
recognize aberrant behavior as a legitimate basis for downward
departure. United States v. Takai215 established that even a
series of acts over a period of time can constitute a "single act"
of aberrant behavior under the Guidelines. 1 6 In United States
v. Morales,217 the court actually vacated a sentence because the
district court failed to consider whether to depart on the basis
of aberrant behavior. 2 18 Thus, Morales extends tremendously
the potential scope of the aberrant behavior departure, even
suggesting that the absence of proof of other criminal activity
is sufficient to support a finding of aberrancy. 219 Another sigThe government conceded at oral argument that if Mother Teresa
were accused of illegally attempting to buy a green card for one of her
sisters, it would be proper for a court to consider her saintly deeds in
mitigation of her sentence. A gangster, on the other hand, should not
be able to get credit for his or her calculated charities. Where a defendant has a blameless record, his or her outstanding generosity
should be able to be taken into account. With the principle established, it is only a matter of degree, and it seems entirely appropriate
for outstanding good deeds by Takai to be considered ....
214. In United States v. Roe, the court reversed, as clearly erroneous, the
district court's conclusion that the circumstances of Roe's abusive childhood
were not "extraordinary" for departure purposes and remanded the case for
the district court to determine whether a departure from the defendant's 145month bank robbery sentence was warranted. 976 F.2d 1216, 1218-19 (9th
Cir. 1992). The court's unusual determination in this case was not only based
on the details of Roe's horrific childhood abuse, but on the uncontradicted
testimony of three medical experts who characterized her abuse as exceptional. Id. at 1218.
215. 941 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1991).
216. Id. at 743 ("[I]t is fair to read 'single act' to refer to the particular action that is criminal, even though a whole series of acts lead up to the commission of the crime."). This ruling contrasts sharply with the Seventh Circuit's approach in United States v. Carey. 895 F.2d 318, 324-25 (7th Cir. 1990)
(ruling multiple acts in check-kiting scheme were not a single act of aberrant
behavior).
217. 961 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1992).
218. Id. at 1432. The court held that the district court committed clear error in holding that no facts justified a finding of aberrant behavior:
Morales had no criminal history and was convicted of one isolated
criminal act. There is no evidence whatsoever in the record that Morales was a regular participant in an ongoing criminal enterprise or
that he has been convicted of several unrelated illegal acts. Because
the absence of evidence of continued criminality constitutes a finding
of aberrancy, the district court erred in thinking that additional
findings were necessary to give it the authority to depart down.
Id.
219. Id.; see also United States v. Fairless, 975 F.2d 664, 667-69 (9th Cir.
1992) (affirming a departure based on aberrant behavior in a bank robbery
case because of first time offender status, emotional distress arising from job
loss, and character testimony).
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nificant Ninth Circuit decision permitted a district court to deon the defendant drug courier's "marginal culpabilpart22based
ity." 0 This decision was significant not only because it could
influence district courts' departure behavior in a large number
of drug cases, but also because it permits district courts to take
into account2 2social and economic conditions in assessing departure factors. '
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit rejected factors relating only
indirectly to the offense and the defendant's culpability. In
United States v. Berlier,222 the court rejected restitution as a
basis for downward departure because downward departure for
acceptance of responsibility already takes restitution into account.223 The court has held that imperfect entrapment, alleged governmental misconduct falling short of the legal standards for an entrapment defense on the merits, is not a basis
for departure. 224 The court also held in United States v. Williams 225 that a government agent's perjury before a grand jury
did not warrant departure.22 6 The court suggested in Williams
that departures on the basis of factors other than the circumstances of the offense or the character of the offender are not
permitted.22 7 It concluded that "the only purpose of a depar-

220. See United States v. Valdez-Gonzalez, 957 F.2d 643, 650 (9th Cir.
1992) (upholding a downward departure from a range of 33 to 41 months to 8
months based on the defendant drug courier's relative lack of culpability).
While citing United States v. Bierley, 922 F.2d 1061, 1069 (3d Cir. 1990), the
Valdez-Gonzalez court held that a "mule's" role is a mitigating circumstance
which the Commission did not adequately consider, despite the existence of a
section 3B1.2 role adjustment. 957 F.2d at 648-49.
221. The court also upheld the district court's reliance on the socioeconomic conditions along the Mexican border in assessing the defendant's relative culpability. United States v. Valdez-Gonzalez, 957 F.2d 643, 649 n.3 (9th
Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Big Crow, 898 F.2d 1326, 1331-32 (8th Cir.
1990)). The district court stated that "one of the reasons that I am departing
in this case is... the [Sentencing] commission had no way of considering the
conditions along the Mexican border where these people [drug mules] are
starving to death...." Id. at 645.
222. 948 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1991).
223. Id. at 1096.
224. United States v. Dickey, 924 F.2d 836, 839 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 943 (1991).
225. 978 F.2d 1133 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 994
(1993).
226. Id. at 1136.
227. Id.
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ture would be to deter government misconduct, a purpose
having no relation to goals of the Sentencing Reform Act."228
The Eleventh Circuit rejected downward departure factors
almost as consistently as it affirmed upward departures. Although in principle the court recognized the permissibility of
departures based on individual offender characteristics, 229 it
held a particularly dim view of such departures and typically
concluded that individual circumstances were
insufficiently ex230
traordinary to permit sentence mitigation.
The court denied downward departures based on other
considerations as well. For example, in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,23' the court rejected the district court's conclusion
that departure from the career offender category was warranted where the defendant's predicate offenses did not involve
force. 232 The Eleventh Circuit determined that the Commission
adequately considered this factor, as the Guidelines distinguish between offenses in which the use of force causes injury
and offenses that merely involve the threat of force.233 Finally,
234
the court rejected a prisoner's voluntary return to custody
228. Id. The court decided this case after the district court sentencing decisions that our study analyzes.
229. See United States v. Mogel, 956 F.2d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1992) ("We
do not interpret this instruction [sections 5H1.1-6 of the Guidelines] as categorically prohibiting departures from the guidelines sentence range based on
the listed offender characteristics... [had the [Congress] wanted to do that,
it knew how.") (quoting United States v. Thomas, 930 F.2d 526, 529-30 (7th
Cir. 1991)).
230. See id. at 1565 (finding the family responsibilities and dependence of
the defendant's two minor children and her mother did not warrant a downward departure, and the defendant's ownership of her own business was not
sufficiently extraordinary to warrant departure); United States v. Cacho, 951
F.2d 308, 311 (11th Cir. 1992) ("[The defendant] has shown nothing more than
that which innumerable defendants could no doubt establish: namely, that the
imposition of prison sentences normally disrupts... parental relationships."
United States v. Daly, 883 F.2d 313, 319 (4th Cir. 1989)); United States v.
Russell, 917 F.2d 512, 516-17 (11th Cir. 1990) (explaining that psychologists
testimony that the defendant suffered from "dependent personality disorder"
was insufficient to warrant a downward departure), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 953
(1991)). But see United States v. Williams, 948 F.2d 706, 710-11 (11th Cir.
1991) (recognizing the possibility of departure for extraordinary acceptance of
responsibility based on drug rehabilitation, but declining to award it under
facts of this case); United States v. Philibert, 947 F.2d 1467, 1472 (11th Cir.
1990) (recognizing possibility of downward departure for mental condition and
remanding to sentencing judge to consider applicability of such a departure).
231. 911 F.2d 542 (11th Cir. 1990).
232. Id. at 549-50.
233. Id. at 550-51.
234. See United States v. Weaver, 920 F.2d 1570, 1574 (11th Cir. 1991).
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and another defendant's minimal role in transporting cocaine 235 as reasonable bases for departure.
C. CONCLUSION

As the appellate court analysis indicates, there are common threads in the departure jurisprudence of the circuits in
this study. All six circuits applied the Diaz-Villafane standard
of review, 236 and each of the appellate courts tended to affirm
upward departures, particularly those based on case-specific
offense circumstances. The circuits differed significantly, however, with respect to downward departures. The circuits split
over discrete issues such as the permissibility of reliance on
individual offender characteristics, family ties and circumstances, employment history, and prior good works. The Second
Circuit tended to accommodate such downward departures,
particularly those based on individual offender characteristics,
while the Seventh Circuit prohibited such departures almost
entirely. The appellate courts also differed as to whether a
sentencing judge could depart upward from a career offender
sentence because the offender's criminal history category understated the nature and extent of prior criminal conduct.237
Beyond these discrete issues, the most noticeable difference among the circuits was the degree of deference with which
they reviewed the extent of departures. While the First and
Eighth Circuits were highly deferential in this regard, especially regarding upward departures, the Second and Seventh
Circuits reviewed the reasonableness of departures more rigorously. The Ninth Circuit eschewed substantive reversals based
on the extent of upward departures, but employed stringent
procedural requirements to control those departures. When
analyzing the departure practices in the district courts, it is
important to bear in mind these differences in jurisprudence
among the circuit courts.

235.

United States v. Asseff, 917 F.2d 502, 506-07 (11th Cir. 1990) (per

curiam).
236. See supra text accompanying notes 148-152 (explaining the DiazVillafane standard of review).
237. See supra notes 160-173 and accompanying text (discussing divergence among the circuits in their treatment of upward departures based on

criminal history).
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IV. DISTRICT COURT DEPARTURE ANALYSIS:
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
The Commission report on which this Article is based, contains a detailed, district-by-district analysis of our findings regarding district court departure practices which is far too
lengthy to reproduce in this Article. This section will, however,
broadly summarize some of the major observations derived
from our extensive review of case files. First, however, a caveat: broad generalizations about district court departure
practices are extremely difficult, due to the enormous range of
fact patterns, departure rationales, and the inherent methodological limitations of the kind of exploratory research this Article represents. A detailed review of 1,400 departure decisions
produced a mountain of impressions and data that tend to defy
easy categorization. As the Commission stated in its introduction to the initial set of Guidelines, the factors that warrant
departure cannot be delineated in advance because of the "vast
range of human conduct potentially relevant to a sentencing
decision." 38 This caveat notwithstanding, some patterns
emerged which deserve attention and an informed attempt at
interpretation.
A. RESISTANCE TO IMPRISONMENT OF WHITE-COLLAR
OFFENDERS

Our research suggests a distinct pattern of judicial resistance to imprisonment for white-collar offenders. The Commission made a policy choice, in part because of past disparity
and in part at the urging of Congress, to increase sentence severity for white-collar economic offenders. Specifically, Congress designed the Guidelines to provide for a brief period of
incarceration for such offenders, most of whom received nonimprisonment sentences of probation in the pre-Guidelines
9
era.23

238. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, § 4(b) (1988).
239. For pre-Guidelines attempts to explain perceived disparities in whitecollar sentencing, see Kenneth Mann et al., Sentencing the White-Collar Of-

fender, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 479 (1980) (examining judicial perceptions to
explain how judges arrive at particular white-collar sanctions); lene H. Nagel
& John L. Hagan, The Sentencing of White-Collar Criminals in Federal
Courts:A Socio-Legal Exploration of Disparity, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1427 (1982)

(testing the hypothesis that sanctions are differentially applied to the benefit
of the white-collar class); Stanton Wheeler et al., Sentencing the White-Collar
Offender: Rhetoric and Reality, 47 AM. Soc. REV. 641 (1982) (testing and
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Our research reveals that downward departures tend, to
some extent, to thwart the Commission's intent to increase the
use of imprisonment for serious white-collar offenders and to
make sentences for such offenders more comparable to those
meted out to non-white-collar offenders found guilty of economic crimes. In the cases we reviewed, white-collar offenders
seemed to benefit disproportionately from downward departures. Typically, these departures involve reduction from a
modest sentence of imprisonment to probation, or to an intermediate sanction such as home confinement. This pattern
seems especially prevalent for female offenders, particularly
those involved in embezzlement or social security fraud. Of
particular interest is that sentencing judges justified these departures on the basis of individual offender characteristics
such as family circumstances, diminished capacity, or the defendant's expression of remorse, despite the Guidelines' exhortation to reserve these bases for departure in only extraordinary, unusual, atypical cases.
A careful reading of the case files suggests not only that
these departures are not reserved for extraordinary cases, but
also that a significant number of these departures are somewhat contrived; that is, these cases reflect offense or offender
circumstances that lack the atypicality required by § 3553(b)
and the Guidelines departure provisions. This apparent judicial resistance to imprisoning white-collar offenders may reflect the sympathetic character of these defendants, judicial
rejection of the Commission's views regarding the seriousness
of white-collar offenses, a judgment by the court that prison is
an inappropriate sentence for non-violent offenses, or a combination of these and other factors. Whatever the reason, the
pattern may have important implications for the Commission's
future deliberations.
B. RARITY OF UPWARD DEPARTURES
The aggregate statistical data published each year by the
Commission indicate that upward departures from the Guidelines are quite rare.24 ° Our analysis suggests that "true" upidentifying correlates that best predict the decision to incarcerate and the differences in length of incarceration).
240. Such cases accounted for an average of only 1.6% of Guidelines sentences in fiscal years 1991 and 1992. 1992 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N ANN.
REP. 127-28 tbl. 50 (1993); 1991 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N ANN. REP. 140-41
tbl. 56 (1992).
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ward departures, that is, those where the defendant receives a
sentence higher than required by the applicable, properly applied Guidelines sentencing range, are even more rare than the
published figures suggest. We found a significant number of
cases where a sentence reported as an upward departure was
actually lower than the sentence which the court should have
applied under the Guidelines as the Commission designed
them. We characterized these cases as "down-ups"-upward
departures designed to partially offset the impact of prosecutorial charging decisions favorable to the defendant.
Down-ups typically occurred in drug trafficking cases or in
cases involving weapons enhancements. In the former, a typical pattern involved a defendant who would be permitted to
plead to a telephone count or to misprision, rather than to a
substantive drug trafficking count under 21 U.S.C. § 841. The
sentencing judge, determining the plea to be appropriate, but
the resulting sentence too low in view of the actual offense conduct, would accept the plea but depart upward from the lower
Guidelines range. 241' Although correctly coded as a departure
from the "applicable" Guidelines sentencing range, the net result was a lower sentence for the defendant than called for in
light of the real offense behavior-hardly a "true" upward departure.
Similar practices were common in departures that involved exposure to a lengthy sentence as a result of the prescribed guideline enhancement for possession of a dangerous
weapon. Typically, the defendant would stipulate in a binding
plea agreement to an upward departure from the applicable
range for a felon-in-possession offense. In exchange, the prosecutor would agree not to pursue an armed career criminal enhancement, which carries a fifteen-year mandatory sentencing
enhancement.24 2 The result was a departure from the Guidelines range, but a sentence considerably lower than the defen-

241. In many of these cases, the upward departure would be stipulated in
a binding plea agreement. For example, a defendant involved in a trafficking
offense, potentially subject to a sentence of 63 to 78 months, would plead
guilty to a telephone count which carries a statutory maximum of 48 months.
The plea agreement would provide for a sentence at or near the maximum, yet
still less than the Guidelines range (or applicable mandatory minimum sentence) for trafficking.
242. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e)(1) (West 1990) (stating sentence of "not less
than fifteen years" for felon-in-possession with three previous convictions for
a violent felony or serious drug offense).
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dant would have received had there not been a plea agreement
to a below-guideline sentence.
In some districts, these down-ups accounted for as many
as half of the reported upward departures. This suggests that
true upward departures occur even less frequently than the
published aggregate statistical data indicate. Additionally,
this pattern may also suggest evidence that some judges accept
plea agreements
that do not adequately reflect the defendant's
243
offense.
C. MALLEABILITY OF CRIMINAL HISTORY CATEGORIES

Our analysis indicates that departures under section
4A1.3, on the basis of the offender's criminal history scores, are
relatively common and that the extensive use of this ground for
departure is perhaps explained by the malleability of this factor.
When the Commission elected to use an offender's prior
sentencing history as the basis for coding the criminal history
score, it discussed at length the potential for this approach to
under- or over-characterize the prior record. For example, this
approach provides no distinction between an offender previously sentenced to five ten-year terms, versus an offender sentenced to five eighteen-month terms. Moreover, no account is
taken of the fact that an offender may have been sentenced to
probation for a prior rape, or to ten years for a petty theft. For
these reasons, among others, the Commission provided in section 4A1.3 that a departure may be appropriate when, in a
specific case, a review of the defendant's prior record indicates
to the court that the criminal history category under- or overrepresents the offender's prior sentencing record. As with all
departures, the working hypothesis was that this departure
provision would be used sparingly, reserving it for the truly
atypical extraordinary cases. It was included, however, to offset a potentially inappropriate sentence in recognition of the
limitations of the measure of criminal sentencing history used.
243. See also Nagel & Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities, supra note 146,
at 527-36 (discussing judicial approval of charging and bargaining practices
that circumvent the Guidelines). The policy statement governing acceptance
of plea agreements urges judges to reject those plea agreements that do not
"adequately reflect the seriousness of the actual offense behavior." U.S.S.G.
(1995), supra note 33, § 6B1.2(a). Thus, the sentencing judge who determines
that a plea agreement does not capture the seriousness of the offender's conduct should reject the plea, rather than depart upwardly to offset the impact
of the plea on the Guidelines sentence.
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The Commission was cognizant of this limitation; however,
other measures of prior criminal record such as felonies and
misdemeanors were similarly imperfect.
An examination of the data reveals that criminal history
served as the basis for a significant number of departures, both
upward and downward. In many districts, inadequacy of the
defendant's CHC in capturing the true extent of prior offenses
accounted for virtually all upward departures; overall, it accounted for more than half of such sentences. In part, these
cases arose because the criminal history calculation did not differentiate adequately among more and less serious criminal records. It is also possible that the ready acceptance of CHCbased upward departures by most courts of appeals 2" permitted sentencing judges to use inadequate CHCs as a rationale
for avoiding imposition of a Guidelines sentence the judge believed too low in light of the perceived seriousness of the offense.
There also were a significant number of cases in which
courts departed downward because the court found that the offender's criminal history score overstated the nature and seriousness of the offender's past criminal conduct. Among these
cases, two patterns emerged. First, judges seemed to depart
downward to offset the impact of the criminal history score of
the prior offense involved, such as drunk or reckless driving,
petty thefts, or passing bad checks. This was especially common when the instant offense conduct was fairly serious, such
as bank robbery, and when the impact of prior convictions was
significant in absolute terms.24 5 The extensive use of such departures is interesting because it represents a judgment by
individual judges to reject the Commission's explicit decision to
include such prior offenses in the calculation of the criminal
history score.
The second pattern, and an even more interesting phenomenon in CHC-based downward departure cases, was the
extensive use of departures from sentences generated by the
career offender provisions.24 6 Our study revealed a number of
244. See supra text accompanying notes 161-169 (describing the Eighth
and Eleventh Circuits' willingness to depart upwardly for a variety of CHCbased grounds).
245. For example, sentencing judges in several cases reduced the CHC for
bank robbery offenders, resulting in sentences near 30 months, rather than
the 51 to 63 month range applicable absent the CHC-based departure.
246. The Guidelines sentences for career offenders, defined as those con-
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cases in which a sentencing judge declined to sentence the defendant under the career offender guideline,247 despite the offender's rightful classification under statutory criteria as a career offender. These departures sometimes occurred because
the court deemed one or more of the predicate convictions, although technically a predicate felony, to be minor or too remote
in time to warrant consideration.2 48 In such cases, the judge
typically would impose the sentence that would have been
applicable in the absence of the career offender provisions.
Such departures were often accompanied by disparaging comments about the career offender provisions or about the Commission itself. Because the career offender statutory prescription requires a sentence at or near the maximum term
authorized,24 9 the resulting departures were generally quite
substantial.
D. DEPARTURE AND JUDICIAL EXPERIENCE/IDEOLOGY
Judge Jack Weinstein, a well-known jurist and frequent
commentator on the Guidelines, hypothesized that the frequency of departures and judicial resistance to the Guidelines
would gradually diminish as newer judges, with no preGuidelines sentencing experience, were appointed and fewer
sentences were imposed by those accustomed
to the uncon250
strained authority of the pre-Guidelines era.
One might also expect that the political and judicial philosophy of individual judges could affect departure practices.
That is, one might predict that judges appointed by the more
conservative presidents, such as Reagan and Bush, would be
less likely to depart downward from Guidelines sentences and
victed of a crime of violence or a serious drug offense who had been previously
convicted of two or more crimes of violence or serious drug offenses, are based
on a congressional statutory directive that such offenders receive a sentence
"at or near the maximum term authorized" by statute. 28 U.S.C. § 994(h)
(1994).
247. U.S.S.G. (1995), supra note 33, § 4B1.1.
248. Similarly, sentencing judges sometimes concluded that two predicate
offenses occurred so close in time to one another, or were otherwise so closely
related, that they should effectively be treated as one offense.
249. 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (1994).
250. See Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge'sReflections on Departuresfrom
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 5 FED. SENTENCING REP. 1, 13 (July/Aug.
1992) (stating "Judges appointed after 1987, never having experienced the responsibility for full independent judgment and having been trained by the
[Federal] Judicial Center in the mechanics of guideline sentencing, will, I hypothesize, tend to be less free about departing").

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:299

perhaps more likely to depart upward than judges appointed
by Carter, or even by Nixon or Ford. Although we undertook
no definitive analysis of this hypothesis, 251 our exploratory examination of these possible relationships suggests that neither
hypothesis is correct. While the tendencies of individual
judges to depart did vary dramatically, we found no clear
ideological or temporal pattern. Reagan and Bush appointees,
who were appointed to the bench after promulgation of the
Guidelines, appeared to be just as willing as their peers to depart, both up and down. Indeed, some of the most prolific users of departure were post-1987 appointees.
E. LINK BETWEEN APPELLATE JURISPRUDENCE AND DISTRICT
PRACTICE

Our research revealed a general pattern of significant, albeit limited, relationships between a circuit court's appellate
jurisprudence and the actual departure behavior of district
judges.
Our analysis of appellate departure jurisprudence25 2 reveals that different circuits vary substantially in their general
approaches to departure. The caselaw of some circuits seems
to encourage or facilitate departure; in others, it is chilling, or
non-facilitative; still others are neutral. For example, the Second Circuit clearly seemed to encourage departures by consistently upholding departures for reasons that other circuits often rejected.2 5 3 Often it based its departures on factors which
the Guidelines designate as "not ordinarily relevant." In contrast, the Seventh Circuit discouraged departures by its many
reversals of departures and by its rigid reading of the Guidelines provisions governing the use of individual offender characteristics in departure.25 4 The Eighth Circuit is an example of
an appellate court that might be classified as neutral, taking a
251. Although the existence of a connection between ideology and departure practices was an issue within the scope of our district court analysis, Part
IV does not report the particular departure rates or dates of appointment of
judges who sit in the districts included in our study. The omission of such information is based on the lack of any meaningful nexus and on our decision to
retain judicial anonymity.
252. See supra Part III (discussing and summarizing departure jurisprudence in the appellate circuits).
253. See supra notes 180-185 and accompanying text (describing the Second Circuit's downward departure jurisprudence).
254. See supra notes 186-194 and accompanying text (describing the Seventh Circuit's downward departure jurisprudence).
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balanced approach to reviewing district court departure decisions.25 5
Beyond this rough typology of the general approaches of
circuit courts, circuit conflicts exist over particular departure
256
issues, such as whether the defendant's employment record
or the defendant's parenting responsibilities 257 are permissible
departure factors. This said, the question for our research became: To what extent do district court departure patterns reflect appellate court jurisprudence?
1. Departure Practices as Reflections of Circuit Caselaw
We found that departure practices did, to some extent,
mirror applicable appellate jurisprudence. An appellate court's
general approach to departure review was reflected in the frequency and distribution of departures at the district court
level. For example, the five judicial districts we studied in the
Seventh Circuit all had downward departure rates below the
national average of approximately six percent. Moreover, the
incidence of departures based on individual offender characteristics such as family ties was low in all districts in this circuit.
These findings likely reflect Seventh Circuit caselaw, which
tended to discourage downward departures, particularly those
based on offender characteristics.
In contrast, the five districts from the Second Circuit exhibited much higher rates of downward departure; in fact, the
District of Connecticut had the highest rate of downward departure of any district in our study. This is consistent with the
caselaw of this circuit, which facilitates downward departure.
Moreover, district court judges in the Second Circuit frequently
justified their decisions to depart downward from the applicable Guidelines sentence on the basis of family ties, a factor almost never cited in the Seventh Circuit, but encouraged by
Second Circuit caselaw.
255. See supra notes 195-205 and accompanying text (describing the
Eighth Circuit's downward departure jurisprudence).
256. Compare United States v. Big Crow, 898 F.2d 1326, 1331-32 (8th Cir.
1990) (affirming downward departure based on employment history and community ties) with United States v. Anders, 956 F.2d 907, 913 (9th Cir. 1992)
(rejecting employment history as a basis for departure).
257. Compare United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124, 126-30 (2d Cir.
1992) (affirming a downward departure for parent of three minor children)
with United States v. Thomas, 930 F.2d 526, 529-30 (7th Cir. 1991)
(interpreting section 5H1.6 as prohibiting downward departures based on
family circumstances), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 419 (1994).
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The impact of particular decisions or lines of appellate
analysis on the approach and reasoning of sentencing judges
also is apparent. For example, district court judges in districts
in the Ninth Circuit were much more likely than other judges
to justify downward departures on the bases of such factors as
the defendant's lack of youthful guidance, co-defendant disparity, and aberrant behavior. Each of these grounds for departure reflects a particular appellate decision or series of decisions that placed a stamp of appellate approval on these
grounds for departure.258 Sentencing judges outside the Ninth
Circuit tended to cite these grounds with much less frequency,
if at all.
2. Intracircuit Variations
The conclusion that appellate caselaw influences district
court decision making is not surprising. A somewhat more interesting pattern emerging from our analysis, however, is that
there were large variations in departure practice among district courts within circuits. These variations, which cannot be
explained by applicable caselaw, apparently are based on differences in the exercise of judicial discretion. A review of the
district-by-district data is replete with examples; however, the

258. Use of co-defendant sentence disparity as a ground for departure was
encouraged by cases such as United States v. Ray, in which the court upheld a
departure from approximately 27 years to 12 years on the ground that the
Guidelines sentence was disproportionate to the sentences received by codefendants subject to non-Guidelines sentencing. 930 F.2d 1368, 1372-73 (9th
Cir. 1990). The Ninth Circuit extended the Ray holding in United States v.
Boshell to cases where a defendant, whose offenses involve both pre- and postGuidelines conduct, would receive a stiffer sentence under the Guidelines
than would co-defendants who plead guilty only to pre-Guidelines offenses.
952 F.2d 1101, 1107-09 (9th Cir. 1991).
The Ninth Circuit's liberal standards for assessing "aberrance," which
were developed in such cases as United States v. Morales, 972 F.2d 1007,
1010-11 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Dickey, 924 F.2d 836, 838-39 (9th Cir.
1991); and United States v. Takai, 941 F.2d 738, 742-44 (9th Cir. 1991), encouraged departure based on aberrant behavior.
Finally, in United States v. Floyd, the court upheld a departure from a
range of 360 months to life to 204 months on the basis of the defendant's
"[1lack of guidance and education, abandonment by parents and imprisonment
at age 17." 945 F.2d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 1991), amended by 956 F.2d 203 (9th
Cir. 1992), superseded by guideline as stated in United States v. Johns, 5 F.3d
1267 (9th Cir. 1993). Although the Commission later rejected Floyd's "youthfll lack of guidance" rationale by amending section 5H1.12, several sentencing
judges in the Ninth Circuit adopted this rationale during the 1991 and 1992
fiscal years.
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following cases from the First and Second Circuits illustrate
this variation.
In the First Circuit's District of Maine, upward departures
outnumbered downward departures by a ratio of 4.5 to 1. Individual offender characteristics accounted for only one departure-a case in which the judge ordered home confinement due
to the defendant's need for medical treatment for cancer. Upward departures, which judges tended to base primarily on the
defendant's criminal history, were typically rather large-some
more than doubled the defendant's Guidelines sentence. In
contrast, the District of New Hampshire, governed by the same
First Circuit caselaw, had a 10 to 1 ratio of downward departures to upward departures. Judges cited reliance on offender
characteristics, including the defendant's lack of guidance as a
youth and the defendant's prior good works and community
service, to explain half of the downward departures. There
were only two upward departures in the district, both based on
the use of a firearm in the offense, and neither was based on
the defendant's criminal history.
In the Second Circuit, the District of Connecticut demonstrated unusually high departure rates. The downward departure rate was over 16%, more than two and one-half times the
national average, and the upward departure rate was 3.9%,
more than twice the national average. Downward departure
rates were driven largely by reliance on individual offender
characteristics, such as family responsibilities, the defendant's
mental and emotional condition, and the defendant's past military service. White-collar offenses, especially embezzlement,
were heavily overrepresented in the downward departure
group in this district. Judges were simply unwilling to imprison these defendants.
In contrast, the Northern District of New York, governed
by the same Second Circuit caselaw, had below average rates of
both upward and downward departures. Downward departures, on the basis of offender characteristics, were virtually
non-existent. The district primarily based downward departures on stipulated plea agreements. These typically occurred
in drug trafficking cases and were based largely on perceived
difficulties in proof.
Contrasting with both of these districts was the Eastern
District of New York. There the downward departure rate exceeded the national average, but upward departures were virtually non-existent. The high downward departure rate in this
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district was driven, not by white-collar offenses, but by the
large number of departures granted to drug couriers convicted
of importing heroin or cocaine from abroad.
Other examples in other circuits could be cited as well.
The point is, however, that there are large variations in departure practice within circuits that cannot be explained by variations in the appellate caselaw. Moreover, there is an interesting pattern to these intracircuit variations: our analysis
suggests that there is a tendency of certain districts to gravitate toward pre-Guidelines severity levels through departure
activity. That is, those districts in which sentence severity was
below the national average in the pre-Guidelines era tended to
exhibit higher-than-average rates of downward departure and
higher-than-average ratios of downward departure to upward
departure.
We evaluated relative pre-Guidelines sentence severity by
comparing mean sentences imposed within each district for
drug offenses, robbery, fraud, and embezzlement with the national mean for each of those offenses. A district with belowaverage mean sentences for more than one-half of the offenses
analyzed was considered a "lenient" district; one with aboveaverage sentences for more than one-half of the four offenses
was considered a "tough" district." 9 Other districts were
"neutral." Of the thirty districts in our study, we classified
fourteen as lenient, ten as tough, and six as neutral in their
pre-Guidelines sentencing practices.
We then evaluated our thirty districts to determine
whether departures in each district tended to make sentencing
tougher or more lenient, by comparing the ratio of downward to
upward departures with the national averages for fiscal years
1991 and 1992. By this measure, we classified thirteen as lenient and fourteen as tough.260 Next, we compared this analysis with the analysis of pre-Guidelines leniency/toughness to
259. We chose this method because a simple comparison of mean overall
sentences fails to account for differences in caseload composition. For example, it would be misleading to compare mean sentences of a district with a
heavy load of drug trafficking offenses and robberies (which tend to be pun'ished fairly severely) with a district that had an unusually high percentage of
embezzlement cases. The latter might treat like offenders more harshly than
the former (imposing higher sentences within each offense category) but have
a lower total mean sentence because of its caseload distribution.
260. These typologies, however, were not necessarily the same districts so
characterized in the pre-Guidelines period. There were 22 districts that were
non-neutral in both the pre-Guidelines and post-Guidelines periods.
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determine whether there was a correlation between preGuidelines sentencing patterns and departure tendencies. On
this crude numerical measure of the non-neutral districts,
twelve were consistent with pre-Guidelines practice, whereas
ten were inconsistent with pre-Guidelines practice. However,
the departure practices of two of the ten inconsistent districts
are attributable to special factors. 26 1 Moreover, our more detailed, qualitative district-by-district analysis indicates even
more strongly than does this simple district head-count the
continuity between pre-Guidelines practice and departure activity in many districts. This continuity suggests the existence
of a sentencing "ethos" within some districts that is resistant to
efforts to impose national uniformity. Departure tends in some
districts to provide a mechanism for gravitation toward preGuidelines sentencing patterns.
F. DEPARTURES ARE NOT LIMITED TO MEANINGFULLY
ATYPICAL CASES
One critical question which this research sought to address
was whether departures are limited, as Congress intended, to
extraordinary or atypical cases. This is not only the most important question but also the most difficult question to answer.
It goes to the very heart of the impact of departure on the
SRA's success in minimizing unwarranted disparity. A clear
answer requires the ability to identify and distinguish legitimate departures from illegitimate ones. This, however, is difficult because the Commission has never articulated a consistent
penologically grounded theory or theories of departure, and
there is no consensus about the appropriate frequency of departure or what constitutes legitimate grounds for departure.
This difficulty is compounded by a lack of complete factual information in the monitoring data. Nevertheless, departure
261. The Western District of Washington had a slightly lower than average
ratio of downward to upward departure, which appeared inconsistent with its
somewhat lenient pre-Guidelines sentencing pattern. Nearly one-third of that
district's upward departures were "down-ups," however. See supra notes 240243 and accompanying text (comparing upward departures to what are
termed, "down-ups"). Adjusting to the "true" upward departure rate renders
that districts post-Guidelines practices consistent with pre-Guidelines sever-

ity data.
Similarly, the apparent inconsistency between pre- and post-Guidelines
practice in the District of South Dakota is misleading. That district's slightly
lenient post-Guidelines departure activity is explained by an unusually large
group of downward departures in firearms cases, a factor which is actually
consistent with that district's pre-Guidelines sentencing data in such cases.
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decisions may be evaluated in light of applicable appellate
caselaw, stated Commission policy, and the factual information
presented in the Probation Officer's presentence report. In
addition, analysis of district-wide trends can suggest whether
factors other than the atypicality of the case explains departure activity.
Our analysis suggests that in a significant minority of
cases, departure is driven by the sentencing judge's desire to
reach a result different from that specified in the Guidelines,
rather than by the presence of meaningfully atypical facts. We
reach this conclusion for several reasons:
1. In a few cases, the sentencing judge expressly stated
that he or she disagreed with the severity of the Guidelines
sentence and had departed for that reason. These cases are
relatively rare, but they exist. Similarly, there were a number
of cases in which the sentencing judge failed to articulate a
reason for departure, or offered a very general explanation,
such as that the departure was "in the interests of justice."
While there may well have been appropriate grounds for departure in some, or even all, of these cases, the absence of an
adequate explanation suggests that there was no articulable
ground for departure.
2. Our review revealed a number of departures based on
grounds generally rejected in the appellate caselaw or by the
Commission as appropriate grounds for departure. Many of
these cases reflect a lack of understanding by sentencing
judges about the policies and purposes underlying particular
Guidelines provisions. Others may reflect a more conscious
disregard of Guidelines policies.
3. The clear patterns of departure in some districts are inconsistent with the Guidelines "heartland" approach, which
contemplates federal sentencing policy as nationally uniform
rather than locally determined. For example, the tendency of
judges in the Eastern District of New York to depart downward
for drug couriers, the high departure rate for female whitecollar criminals in the District of Connecticut, and the high departure rate for firearms offenders in the District of South Dakota, among other trends, all suggest that some departures are
based on judges' sympathies and policy views, rather than on
the presence of atypical factors in particular cases.
Judicial predisposition to influence departure practices is
not particularly surprising. Congress determined that binding
Guidelines were necessary precisely because judges' policy
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views and sympathies played a central role in the sentencing of
individual offenders too often. Our findings do, however, highlight the inherent difficulty in eliminating unwarranted sentencing disparity, while at the same time, preserving discretion
to deal with individual cases. This should give pause to those
who would advocate broad expansion of sentencing judges'
authority to depart from the Guidelines.
CONCLUSION
What lessons can be drawn from our analysis of departure
practices? First, the apparent incursion of judges' preferences
into departure decisions and the tendency of departure patterns to mirror pre-Guidelines severity levels highlight the inherent limitations of legislative control over judicial decisionmaking. As long as some discretion is left in the system, some
disparity in the application of general rules to specific cases
will occur.
In our judgment, further reductions in disparity cannot,
however, be imposed by legislative fiat. The Commission must
improve its efforts to articulate clear and sensible policies underlying Guidelines provisions; these efforts are necessary to
build consensus and provide clearer guidance to both district
and appellate judges regarding the situations in which departure is appropriate. These efforts will help ensure that judges
exercise their discretion to depart for sound reasons and in a
more consistent manner.
Furthermore, we come away from this research with a
heightened sensitivity to the vast range of federal criminal
conduct, and the enormous variability in fact situations presented for sentencing. Congress and the Commission must
recognize the crucial role departures play in maintaining sufficient flexibility to address unusual cases. Above all, Congress
should permit the Guidelines to work, rather than impose inflexible mandatory minimum sentences as it has increasingly
shown a tendency to do.
Our research suggests that the Commission may wish to
reevaluate its policies in light of the experiences of the courts.
Our findings on white-collar departure suggest that the Commission should reexamine its approach to white-collar sentencing. If policy changes to encourage alternatives to incarceration are in order, the Commission should enact them. If not,
the Commission must articulate more clearly why not, and aid
judges in identifying cases in which departures are appropri-
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ate. Sentencing judges also have an obligation to recognize
that personal policy preferences might influence their decisions
about whether a case is sufficiently atypical to warrant departure from the applicable Guidelines range.
Sentencing reform is an evolving process. Its success will
require the good faith and sound input of all key institutionsCongress, the Commission, and the courts. Each institution
must participate in the dialogue over sentencing policy, listen
to the considered views of the others, and modify its positions
based on collective experience.

